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DUTY AND DIVERSITY  
 
 





In the wake of the brutal deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, a slew of reforms 
from Wall Street to the West Coast have been introduced, all aimed at increasing Diversity, 
Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) in corporations.  Yet the reforms face difficulties ranging 
from possible constitutional challenges to critical limitations in their scale, scope and 
degree of legal obligation and practical effects.  
In this Article, we provide an old answer to the new questions facing DEI policy, and 
offer the first close examination of how corporate law duties impel and facilitate corporate 
attention to diversity.  Specifically, we show that corporate fiduciaries are bound by their 
duties of loyalty to take affirmative steps to make sure that corporations comply with 
important civil rights and anti-discrimination laws and norms designed to ensure fair access 
to economic opportunity. We also show how corporate law principles like the business 
judgment rule do not just authorize, but indeed encourage American corporations to take 
effective action to help reduce racial and gender inequality, and increase inclusion, 
tolerance and diversity given the rational basis that exists connecting good DEI practices 
corporate reputation and sustainable firm value.  By both incorporating requirements to 
comply with key anti-discrimination laws mandatorily, and enabling corporate DEI policies 
that go well beyond the legal minimum, corporate law offers critical tools with which 
corporations may address DEI goals that other reforms do not—and that can embed a 
commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion in all aspects of corporate interactions with 
employees, customers, communities, and society generally.  The question therefore is not 
whether corporate leaders can take effective action to help reduce racial and gender 
inequality—but will they?  
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Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman famously told corporate fiduciaries 
that they should narrowly focus on generating profits for stockholders.  Less 
focused upon, but explicit, was his view that corporations should not have a 
“social conscience” and take action to “eliminat[e] discrimination,” which he 
trivialized as a “watchword[] of the contemporary crop of reformers.”1  Since 
then, Friedman and his adherents have espoused this cramped vision of 
fiduciary duty within the debate over corporate purpose, and even worse, 
sought to erode the external laws promoting equality and inclusion. 
In 2021, the problem Milton Friedman trivialized remains urgent.  The 
inequality gap between Black and white Americans has grown in the period in 
which Friedman’s views became influential with directors and policymakers 
and the pandemic’s unequal impact on minorities has underscored the 
persistence of inequality.  So have horrific instances of violence against Black 
people and other evidence of ongoing exclusion.  Likewise, inequality in wages 
and opportunity continue to adversely affect women. 
Demands are growing for corporate leaders to address these serious 
issues by promoting effective practices to treat their employees, communities 
of operation, and service and customers with respect—and to take affirmative 
steps to ensure equal opportunity, create an inclusive and tolerant workplace, 
and embrace the diversity of humanity.  This commitment to Diversity, Equity, 
and Inclusion (“Diversity” or “DEI” for short) is not just one corporations are 
being asked to make internally, but is also one requiring that companies 
evaluate how they treat their consumers and the communities in which they 
have an impact.2  Although the present moment has tended to mute those who 
	
1 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine–The Social Responsibility Of Business Is To 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com
/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-
to.?smid=em-share. In that same passage, Friedman similarly belittled “providing 
employment” for workers and “avoiding pollution.”  Fifty years later, racial inequality, 
income and wage inequality, and environmental harm remain huge societal problems. 
2	Because Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the corporate context is a comprehensive 
commitment to treating all stakeholders with respect regardless of their race, ethnicity, 
religion, or sexual orientation, to the extent we use Diversity (with a capital “D”) as 
shorthand, it at all times reflects this broader understanding and all the letters of DEI.  We 
also will periodically employ “diversity” (with a small “d”) to denote specifically a focus 
on demographic heterogeneity as understood in its everyday context, and with an emphasis 





view corporate action to address issues like Diversity as an improper and 
illegitimate diversion from the pursuit of shareholder profits, history shows that 
will not last for long. Those who share Friedman’s worldview will argue that 
corporate fiduciaries are on unstable ground if they commit their companies to 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion policies that go beyond the legal minimum of 
nondiscrimination, and will suggest they face possible legal risk for failing to 
focus solely on corporate profit.  Indeed, even in a year when issues of racial 
equality have been central and leading members of the corporate community 
are recognizing their obligation to do better, some have openly taken 
Friedman’s position and have admonished their employees to stay focused on 
profits and do not concern themselves with Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in 
the workplace.  We fear that when the current moment passes, these voices will 
multiply and twist corporate law to argue that corporate leaders may not take 
action to assure that their companies are going beyond the bare legal minimum 
to promote these important values, because by doing so they would be 
improperly diverting their focus from profit maximization. 
In this Article, we explain why arguments of that type have no 
grounding in a proper understanding of corporate law, and in particular the 
important principles of fiduciary duty that govern the equitable expectations of 
corporate directors and officers.  We show that, even under the nation’s most 
stockholder-focused corporate law, that of Delaware, Friedman’s normative 
view is not one that American corporate law embraces, and that corporate law 
presents no barrier to voluntary corporate efforts to increase equality and 
diversity. 
In fact, a proper understanding of corporate fiduciary duties supports 
the ability of corporations to put in place effective DEI policies.  Indeed, 
fiduciary duty requires boards to attend to DEI, by monitoring company 
policies and practices that assure the company’s compliance with important 
laws that focus on the equal treatment of diverse applicants, employees, 
customers, communities, and business partners.   Not only that, the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty requires affirmative efforts to promote the sustainable success 
of the corporation, directors and managers must try to promote the best 
interests of the company.  Substantial evidence exists that companies with good 
DEI practices will not only be less likely to face adverse legal, regulatory, 
worker,  community and consumer backlash from their conduct, but that their 
boards and workforces will be more effective, their reputation with 
increasingly diverse customer bases and public will grow, as will trust from 
institutional investors increasingly focused on sustainable profitability and the 
avoidance of harmful externalities costly to their clients, who have diversified 
portfolios tracking the entire economy. 
As a matter of fiduciary duty, therefore, corporate leaders not only have 
broad authority to promote an inclusive and diverse corporate culture, their 
affirmative obligation to act in the best interests of the corporation can be 
understood to require it, given the important legal requirements for 
corporations to avoid invidious discrimination and growing societal and 
	
on historically underrepresented groups.  This diversity is part and parcel of DEI, though 
only part. 
 





investor expectations that business will contribute to reducing racial and 
gender inequality.  Even more, foundational corporate law principles like the 
business judgment rule protect and support directors and managers who believe 
that committing their companies to help improve Diversity, Equity, and 
Inclusion is the right way to do business.  And that fiduciary duty does impose 
minimal guardrails and even floors of basic activity that must be undertaken to 
ensure that corporations honor societal laws protecting against discrimination. 
This legal reality is important to ensuring that the accountability debate 
over whether corporate leaders, and the institutional investors who control 
public companies, are doing what they should to promote these values proceeds 
with clarity.  All too often, the issue of Diversity is viewed as a cost center, or 
something external to the mission of the modern firm—driving criticisms of 
Diversity-oriented corporate reforms as “virtue signaling at the expense of 
someone else.”3  But this Article advances a  different theory—that the pursuit 
of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion is solidly authorized by the operation of 
traditional corporate law principles, and can even be easily squared with the 
views of those who embrace what has come to be known as  “shareholder 
primacy.”  As such, our contribution does not debate what corporate law 
“should be,” but instead explores what corporate law already “is”—and offers 
an old answer to the novel question of what tools and obligations managers and 
directors must contemplate when grappling with the challenge and opportunity 
of Diversity. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part One, we document the 
demographic dilemma facing corporate boards and C-suites across the United 
States—namely, the striking gap between the demographics of the leadership 
of corporate America and the nation as a whole.  We then explore the 
implications of the data in a post-George Floyd, post-pandemic environment, 
in which demands for better corporate behavior and greater racial economic 
opportunity have both swelled and intensified. 
Part Two addresses the nexus between Diversity, Equity, and 
Inclusion, and firm value.  It starts with a survey of the empirical research 
associating diversity with financial performance, and finds a mixed picture, but 
one that nonetheless has practical and legal importance for corporate 
decisionmakers weighing whether and how to address DEI issues.  We find 
that as in many complex areas relevant to running a business, information is 
incomplete, at times defective and a work in progress; nevertheless the 
evidence from academic studies, and the logical arguments advanced by 
leading business consultants and thinkers, provide a rational basis for corporate 
fiduciaries to conclude that effective DEI policies are in the best interests of 
the corporation.  Continuing this theme, we then turn our analysis to the long-
running literature in organizational psychology that identifies cognitive 
diversity (and Diversity more generally) as prophylactics for groupthink and 
	
3 The Editorial Board, The Woke Nasdaq, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-woke-nasdaq-11606865986.  Such criticisms have been 
embraced by some of the most respected regulatory voices as well.  See Arthur Levitt Jr, If 
Corporate Diversity Works, Show Me the Money, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-corporate-diversity-works-show-me-the-money-
11611183633 (arguing that “diversity requirements are political at their core”). 





other social pathologies that can impair good decisionmaking and thus, in this 
context, endanger firm value.  We then close this section with what is perhaps 
the most compelling business case for Diversity—that of corporate reputation 
and its relationship to firm credibility and success.  The section investigates 
how DEI relates in a broader way to corporate success, highlights why attention 
to DEI is necessary for businesses to avoid the severe reputational harm, legal 
risk, and other downside consequences of being perceived as not being a 
business committed to treating all Americans with respect.  We then connect 
that risk to the demographic realities facing firms seeking to preserve and 
maximize their returns.  Because the available workforce, customer base, and 
strategic partners are diversifying both domestically and internationally, DEI 
considerations bear importantly on firms’ reputation with these key 
stakeholders, and thus on their cost of capital, talent and customer acquisition 
and retention.  For all these reasons, we conclude that the requisite foundation 
for corporate policies advancing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion exists, 
making the adoption of these policies, as we later address in more detail, 
eligible for the protection of the business judgment rule. 
Part Three examines current legislative and market initiatives to 
improve DEI within the corporate sector. To provide context, we start with an 
analysis of key federal laws that advance racial and gender equality in the 
business sector.  We then catalogue a growing number of initiatives:  
investment fund activities where employee, environmental, social and 
governance factors (EESG) have been integrated into investment processes,4 
California and New York state corporate law reforms aiming for greater board 
diversity, proposed new listing rules for Nasdaq requiring disclosure of 
corporate board metrics, and a pledge made by Goldman Sachs to only assist 
companies meeting minimum diversity metrics when going public.  These 
initiatives, we find, hold the prospect of potentially important upgrades to 
corporate Diversity.  We conclude, however, that many face substantial 
constitutional challenges.  As important, virtually all are board-level initiatives, 
and do not cover private companies, which comprise an increasingly large 
share of economic activity in our economy.  Nor do they address Equity and 
Inclusion, and by extension issues such as how corporations use contracted 
workers and interact with customer communities They are thus, by definition, 
limited in their reach and robustness.   For these reasons, if serious 
improvement in corporate practices is desirable, supplemental actions by 
corporations will be essential.  
	
4 Notably, these arrangements are described in the literature, and by the participants 
themselves, in different ways, though traditionally as “ESG” programs in light of the 
importance of environmental social, and governance factors in investment decisions.  We 
use the term “EESG” in this Article to highlight the additional emphasis many corporations 
and funds are placing on how corporations treat the constituency arguably most responsible 
for its success — the employees — with respect.   See David Katz and Laura A. McIntosh, 
Corporate Governance Update: EESG and the COVID-19 Crisis, HARVARD L. SCHOOL 
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 31, 2020), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/31/corporate-governance-update-eesg-and-the-
covid-19-crisis (noting increasing stakeholder- and employee centric disclosures in 
response to the human capital impact of the COVID-19 crisis). 





In Part Four, we provide a foundational theory of how the corporate 
law of fiduciary duty applies to corporate Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion 
policies.  First, we explain the general principles underlying the duties of 
loyalty and care, and how the corporation’s obligation to comply with the law 
is fundamental to the operation of corporate law.  We show that the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty requires not only a negative responsibility to avoid harm to the 
corporation, but that it also requires the duty to take affirmative steps to 
advance the best interests of the corporation.  This includes, as reflected in 
Delaware’s famous Caremark decision, an obligation for fiduciaries to 
undertake active efforts to promote compliance with laws and regulations 
critical to the operations of the company.  Importantly, we show that the most 
central role of Caremark is in the normative obligation it imposes on directors 
and to try to avoid the regulatory penalties, managerial turnover, stakeholder 
backlash, and overall reputational and financial harm that occurs when 
companies violate laws essential to society.  As we show, the very fact that a 
Caremark case is brought is usually a sign that the company has already lost, 
even if the directors do not ultimately face liability under Caremark itself.   We 
also highlight the considerable discretion that the affirmative component of 
fiduciary duty law gives business leaders to pursue policies they rationally 
believe to be in the best interests of the corporation, in terms of its sustained 
profitability and reputational integrity with its stakeholders, society, and 
regulators.      
Part Five takes the crucial step of showing how these general principles 
apply specifically to DEI.  As to managers and directors skeptical about DEI, 
or those who fear Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion might be beyond their remit 
of responsibility as fiduciaries, we explain why fiduciary duty requires them to 
focus to some meaningful extent on anti-discrimination practices, and why 
failing to do so is riskier than making sure the company has effective DEI 
practices.  We show how the legal expectation of lawful conduct, reflected in 
Delaware’s Caremark decision, charges fiduciaries with preventative 
monitoring for compliance with anti-discrimination laws and legislation as a 
core feature of their duty of loyalty.  Should they fail to do so, not only do 
companies risk corporate liability accompanying such violations; they also 
face—along with their directors and top managers—the possibility of large 
reputational costs, stakeholder backlash, internal turnover at the top of 
management and on the board itself, and fines and injunctions from regulators, 
even if the follow-on derivative lawsuits are ultimately dismissed.  From this 
standpoint, corporate law’s fiduciary duty of compliance is not only important 
as a matter of “hard” law enforced by  the threat of corporate and personal 
liability.  It also defines as normative “soft” law what fiduciaries are expected 
by corporate law to do, legal expectations that go beyond what fiduciaries can 
be held liable for in damages and that require them to protect the corporation 
from the financial, management, and  reputational consequences that come 
when a corporation fails to comply with critical legal duties, consequences that 
in the context of DEI-related issues have been supercharged in the wake of 





George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, and the inequality-revealing and 
exacerbating Pandemic.5 
We then close by identifying why corporate managers and directors 
who wish to fulfill their normative duty of loyalty by taking affirmative steps 
to improve sustainable corporate profitability can safely embrace a 
commitment to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion — i.e., more ambitious DEI 
policies that go beyond their duty under Caremark to monitor core anti-
discrimination compliance obligations.  In doing so, we emphasize that 
corporate fiduciaries do not need definitive evidence of DEI’s impact on value 
to act.  Because there is a rational basis for concluding that the promotion of 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion will improve the ability of corporations to 
function profitably in an increasingly diverse domestic and international 
economy, fiduciary duty law, and in particular the business judgment rule, 
provides authorization for corporate DEI policies and therefore leaves business 
leaders no corporate law reason not to adopt them, and some strong reasons to 
do so. 
In forwarding this framework, this Article offers a doctrinally sound, 
yet novel approach that will not be without its ideological detractors.  For all 
of the attention now directed at DEI in Corporate America, Diversity is not 
usually talked about as a matter of long-standing corporate law principles.  
Indeed, from Friedman’s derision of reformist “watchwords” to a sensitivity 
even among some Black Lives Matter activists to belittling the significance of 
Diversity by reducing a moral call to action to one of business prerogatives, 
Diversity is most commonly understood as an external matter to the firm.   
We believe, however, that the case for Diversity has both a strong 
moral and business rationale, making it relevant even as a matter of traditional 
corporate law principles. Moreover, the internal/external dichotomy of the 
Friedman view is highly misleading: the very DNA of corporate law’s most 
foundational duty, that of loyalty, is as much outwardly facing as it is inwardly 
to the extent to which it creates obligations to comply with all laws—including 
core civil rights legislation—that are of critical importance to the company, its 
stakeholders, and society.  These clarifications enable important interventions 
for refining current reforms and enabling new ones within even our legacy 
corporate law framework.  This important reality poses a substantial question 
to American business leaders, and the institutional investors who wield power 
over them:  If corporate law not only enables directors and the board to address 
important DEI issues, but also requires corporate attention to them, will they 
meet their duties head on, and even exceed them, or will they incur the high 




5 By soft law, scholars refer to norms or guidelines, that though perhaps not legally binding 
at all or, as in the case of Caremark, not easily enforceable by way of monetary damages 
for their violation, but which nonetheless carry high costs where they are violated.  For 
more, see Chris Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 141 (2012) 
(noting how a poor reputation can hinder a regulator’s ability to conduct economic 
diplomacy). 	





I.   THE DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA:  THE INEQUALITY AND 
 REPRESENTATIONAL GAP IN CORPORATE AMERICA 
 
Discussions about corporate law—whether in the context of mergers & 
acquisitions, proxy statements or (much more rarely) Diversity—invariably 
focus on boards and management. It is in part because of the very peculiar 
governance challenges corporate leaders face vis-a-vis the corporation’s 
shareholders; plus it reflects the concentrated power they wield collectively in 
making decisions that impact shareholders, employees and broader society.  
Yet American corporate leadership is marked unrepresentative of our nation’s 
diversity—a reality that stands in stark contrast to broad calls for fairer 
economic opportunity and participation.  To this end, we provide an overview 
of the most recent data concerning the Diversity of U.S. corporate boards and 
management. We then situate  the problem against the backdrop of hug racial 
wealth and income gaps underscored by the Pandemic and calls across society 
in the wake of George Floyd’s brutal death to reform corporations in ways that 
not only diversify corporate upper ranks, but that also embed a commit to 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in all corporate action affecting  important 
corporate stakeholders. 
 
 A. Corporate Boards:  Their 21st Century Importance and the  
  Representational Gap 
 
Corporate boards are intended to help address three sorts of agency 
problems associated with corporate organizations: those between managers 
and dispersed shareholders, between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders, and between shareholders and creditors.6 And despite an earlier 
New Deal perception of corporate boards as part of a concentration of 
economic power catalyzed the rise of the large corporation, boards are today 
recognized as serving a key gatekeeping function given incentive problems that 
can arise in the separation of shareholder “ownership” and “control” by 
managers, especially apparent in public companies.7   
On a less theoretical basis, corporate boards have also increased in 
importance because of real-world developments.  Since concerns emerged 
about managerial improprieties in the 1970s, leading to the mandate for audit 
committees of outside directors, and the takeover boom of the 1980s, in which 
independent directors came to the fore as an answer to the problems such bids 
presented for management,8 corporate boards as an institution have become 
	
6 Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1907, 1910 (2013).	
7 Id.  See also Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (identifying the separation of ownership and control as a master 
problem in corporate law and sociology). Though notably, for Berle and Means, the idea 
of “managers” consisted of both the “board of directors and the senior officers of the 
corporation.”  Id. at 146.  
8 Marty Lipton’s iconic article, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 1 
(1979), by way of example, articulated the manner in which a board of directors should 
operate in the context of a takeover bid, with a strong role for the non-management 
directors to deliberate among themselves and to oversee management’s conduct.  That 





increasingly important in corporate governance.9  The board is now taken 
seriously as a governing instrument in itself, distinct in important ways from 
day-to-day top managers, and corporate case law, Exchange Rules,10 and 
statutory reforms at the state and federal level have only acted to emphasize 
the salience of the role of the board.11 
Because of the increasing centrality of corporate boards, they have 
been the focus of a greater number of electoral and other challenges in recent 
decades, with institutional investors pressing for greater numbers of 
independent directors who would be more responsive to their demands, and 
who have characteristics institutional investors favor.12  But that focus on the 
composition of boards has not translated into boards representative of our 
nation; rather, corporate, boards have fallen short of even minimal thresholds 
of racial or gender Diversity.  African Americans comprise 13.4% of the U.S. 
population, for example, but only 8.6% of the boards of the Fortune 500 
companies.13  See Figure 1.A.  Meanwhile, the share of white people on boards 
	
article would then influence the Delaware Supreme Court in key cases like Unocal v. Mesa 
Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (1985), in encouraging a strong hand for independent 
directors and creating standards of review that shifted power away from management and 
toward them.	
9 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
237, 238 (1997) (“The board is not itself unflawed, but as an organ that is compact and 
cohesive, individualized to the corporation, and capable of being made relatively 
independent of management control, it is well situated to monitor management on an 
ongoing and close basis on the shareholders’ behalf.”).	
10 The NYSE requires listed companies to “have a nominating/corporate governance 
committee composed entirely of independent directors.” NYSE Listed Company Manual 
Section 303A.04(a).  NASDAQ requires director nominees of listed companies “must 
either be selected, or recommended for the Board’s selection, either by: (A) Independent 
Directors consulting a majority of the Board’s Independent Directors in a vote in which 
only Independent Directors participate, or (B) a nominations committee comprised solely 
of Independent Directors.”  NASDAQ Equity Rule 5605(e).	
11 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900-03 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o);  Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77 (codified as 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7201 et seq.).	
12 During the last two decades, the incidence of proxy fights, withhold campaigns, and 
other contested votes has markedly increased, as has the rate of success of those efforts in 
procuring, by agreement or ballot box victory, what the insurgents wanted.  See, e.g., John 
C. Coffee and Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on 
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016) (identifying only 52 hedge fund activist 
campaigns over 20 consecutive months in 2005-2006 in contrast to 1,115 such campaigns 
between 2010 and early 2014, with 347 campaigns alone in 2014).  In the United States, 
there were 261 “high impact campaigns,” defined as campaigns involving any of these 
market-moving objectives: board control/representation; maximize shareholder value; 
public short position/bear raid; remove director/officer(s); and no dissident nominee to fill 
vacancy, and 77 proxy fights in 2012, whereas even during the year of the pandemic, 2020 
saw 331 high impact campaigns and 98 proxy fights.  FACTSET.COM.	
13 Jeff Green, Focus on Black Directors Has Latinos Asking: What About Us?, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-
18/latinos-call-for-board-seats-left-out-of-efforts-to-promote-black-directors.  For 
Latinos, the numbers are even more skewed.  Despite comprising roughly 18.3% of the 





far outstrips that of Black people.  On the boards of Fortune 500 companies, 
for example, whites reportedly comprise 83.9% of all members, over 28% 
higher than that of their percentage of the U.S. population.  See again Figure 
1.B.  
Women’s representation on Fortune 500 Boards, at 26.1%, compares 
favorably to that of African Americans and Latinx, who make up roughly only 
12.5%.  They are, however, as a group, still disproportionately 
underrepresented compared to their 50.2% share of the overall population.14  
Within this demographic, white women have seen their share of board seats 
increase the most, from around 15.7% in 2004 to 22.5% in 2018, accounting 
for nearly 70% of board seats transferred from white men.15 See Figure 1.C.  
Minority women, meanwhile, saw virtually no increase in their board 
representation, with a gain of only 1%, from 3.2% to 4.6%.  Minority men also 









U.S. population, Latinos only comprise 3.8% of Fortune 500 boards — less than a quarter 
of their representation among the wider population.  See HACR Corporate Governance 
Survey.  Moreover, their participation does not appear to reflect  the demographic changes 
facing the country.  Since 1990, the Latinx share of the U.S. population has more than 
doubled from 9% in 1990 to 20% today.  But even with this exponential increase of nearly 
10% in the last two decades, the percentage of Fortune 500 board seats held by Latinos 
increased in this time by less than 3%.  Green, supra note 12. 
14 Women on Corporate Boards: Quick Take, CATALYST (Mar. 13, 2020), 
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-on-corporate-boards/.  
15 On the other hand, minority men and women saw their share of board seats grow only 
3.3%, from 12.8% to 16.1%. We Know Diversity is Good for Business, So Why Do 
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Source: Diversity Jobs 
 
An extensive literature has grown detailing the sources of the 
demographic shortcomings of corporate boards.  The prospects for Black and 
female corporate board membership improved gradually in the aftermath of the 
Civil Rights movement of the 1960s.  But progress has often been sporadic and 
slow.17  
	
17 Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and 
Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 580 (2006) (  “while 
women have made substantial progress onto boards since 1934 as well as significant 
contributions to those boards, they confront considerable barriers to board membership that 
must be addressed proactively”). 





This literature identifies a number of common obstacles to board 
diversity, most relating to how board members are chosen.  First, boards often 
lean towards candidates who have run business units or held operations posts—
in short, chief executives from other companies who have served on an outside 
board—which translates into a pool of fewer female and minority candidates.  
Absent efforts to look for leaders with management experience in sectors of 
the economy—government, military, education, and legal — where minority 
and women have made more inroads,18 corporate boards will tend to reflect the 
composition of corporate management ranks.  Additionally, board seats for the 
country’s largest companies are rarely available due to low turnover—and the 
number of candidates interviewed is often small and often comprised of 
candidates with prior board experience.19  As a result, opportunities for 
Diversification are few, and even where slots are open, minority candidates 
and women may not be interviewed at all.20  
But arguably the most important reason is that women and 
minorities are unlikely to have the social networks and relationships 
necessary for candidates seeking positions on boards. CEOs prefer 
individuals they can trust, know are competent, are professionally 
accomplished, and can collaborate with—and influence.21  Often, this leads 
to the consideration of individuals who are already known within the social 
circles of C-Suite executives or other board members.  These dynamics 
disadvantage women and minorities who do not necessarily hail from or 
participate in the same cultural or socioeconomic networks as the white men 
who dominate corporate boards.22  Though for those underrepresented 
	
18 See, e.g., Eileen Patten and Kim Parker, Women in the U.S. Military: Growing Share, 
Distinctive Profile, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2011, https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2011/12/women-in-the-military.pdf (“The share of women among 
the enlisted ranks has increased seven-fold, from 2% to 14%, and the share among 
commissioned officers has quadrupled, from 4% to 16%.”); Dylan Jackson, The 2020 
Diversity Scorecard Shows Progress, but It’s More Precarious Than Ever (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2020/05/26/the-2020-diversity-scorecard-shows-
progress-but-its-more-precarious-than-ever/ (“[M]inority attorneys have seen a 3.9% 
increase in representation among the country’s largest firms.”); Hilary Burns, Study: 
Higher ed could be first Mass. sector to hit gender parity, 
https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2019/11/04/study-higher-ed-could-be-first-
mass-sector-to-hit.html (“Women make up 48% of all provosts in Massachusetts and 55% 
of all deans and senior leadership team members statewide.”).	
19 J. Yo-Jud Cheng, et al., Why Do Boards Have So Few Black Directors?, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/why-do-boards-have-so-few-black-
directors?registration=success.	
20 Id.  
21 See generally Udi Hoitash, Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties 
Disqualify Themselves from Serving on a Board?, 99 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 399 (2011).  
22 We do not ignore the reality that corporate directors and managers are not representative 
of typical white men either.  On balance, they come from far more privileged and elite 
backgrounds than typical white Americans.  [to cite] Indeed, in our view of Diversity, 
Equity, and Inclusion, efforts to include all Americans are important, and that includes 
white people who do not come from privileged backgrounds, and who often face some of 
the same difficulties in opportunity and access as people of color with limited means.  See 
Adia Harvey Wingfield, How Organizations Are Failing Black Workers — and How to Do 
Better (Jan. 16, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/how-organizations-are-failing-black-





persons who do make it, they fit to form:  A 2016 survey of over 1,000 
board directors indicated that over half of Black directors were known to a 
fellow board member before being appointed (as compared to 35% of white 
directors).23  Similarly, white directors were more likely to be a current or 
former executive of the company.  Nearly one third were already known by 
the CEO by the time they were introduced to the board.24 
 
 B. CEOs and C-Suite Officers:  The Representational Chasm  
  Deepens at the Top Management Level 
 
General corporate statutes vest management, and in particular the chief 
executive officer, with making major corporate decisions, and overseeing the 
operations and resources of a company.25  CEOs are the most important single 
officers of corporations, and in their management capacities are tasked with 
ensuring that the goals of the corporate board are pursued at lower levels of the 
firm.   In practice, this means that CEOs hire other executives and staff, 
implement corporate policy and board instructions, and serve as the primary 
interface between the broader public and the corporation.  CEOs are also 
primarily responsible for identifying how resources of the company are 
directed, and for what purpose.  They may also be responsible for 
implementing recruiting, retention and promotion strategies at the firm and 
ensuring a workplace culture commensurate with the objectives of the 
company. 
Even though what is required to be an effective CEO can vary 
considerably by industry, CEOs, like the board which is responsible for 
managing them, are a highly homogenous group.  When it comes to CEOs of 
S&P 500 companies, only 11% are ethnic minorities.26  Specifically, 3% are 
Latino, 3% are Indian, 2% are Asian, 1% are Middle Eastern, 1% are 
multiracial, and 1% are Black.27  
 
	
workers-and-how-to-do-better (finding that many organizations fill available director 
positions through social networks, just as elite professional service firms strongly prefer, 
similar to elite professional service firms that only hire from a few select, elite universities 
in the East Coast). 
23 Cheng, supra note 19.  
24 Cheng, supra note 19.  
25 Will Kenton, Chief Executive Officer, INVESTOPEDIA (July 1, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ceo.asp. 
26 Te-Ping Chen, Why Are There Still So Few Black CEOs?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2020, 
10:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-are-there-still-so-few-black-ceos-
11601302601 (stating that African Americans represent only 3% of executive or senior-
level roles among U.S. companies with 100 or more employees).  
27 Id.   









Things get hardly better when assessing the diversity of Fortune 500 
C-Suites, the most senior leaders of large companies that include not only the 
chief financial officer (CFO), but also the chief operating officer (COO), and 
the chief information officer (CIO).  In this rarified group of officers, just 3.2% 
are African Americans.28  Only 4.3% of Fortune 500 executives are Latinx.29  
Meanwhile, an overwhelming majority—over 85%—are white. 
	
28 Being Black in Corporate America: An Intersectional Exploration, COQUAL (Sept. 
2020), https://coqual.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/CoqualBeingBlackinCorporateAmerica090720-1.pdf (finding 
that despite the disparate numbers, African American professionals are more likely than 
white professionals to be ambitious; overall, 65% of African Americans were considered 
“very ambitious” in their careers, compared to 53% of their white counterparts). 
29 J.D. Swerzenski, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Eric Hoyt, This is where there are the 
most Hispanic Executives (and it’s not where you think), FAST COMPANY (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90456329/this-is-where-there-are-the-most-hispanic-
executives-and-its-not-where-you-think.  







Source:  JD Swerzenski, University of Massachusetts Amherst 
 
As in the case of corporate boards, there are more women occupying 
top executive roles than underrepresented minorities—167 at the country’s top 
3,000 companies.30  And the data indicate that there has been progress made 
by women among C-Suite executives, growing from roughly 7% of top 
management to nearly 12% today.31  By comparison, of the 279 top executives 
listed at the 50 biggest companies in the S&P 100, only five are Black.32 Still, 
women remain overwhelmingly underrepresented when compared to their 
50.5% share of  the overall size in the U.S. population.33 Moreover, women 
hold only seven percent of CEO positions among Fortune 500 companies, with 
	
30 Vanessa Fuhrmans, Where Are All the Women CEOs?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2020, 10:34 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-so-few-ceos-are-women-you-can-have-a-seat-at-
the-table-and-not-be-a-player-11581003276.  
31 Fuhrmans, supra note 30. 
32 Jessica Guynn & Brent Schrotenboaer, Why are there still so few Black executives in 
America?, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/in-
depth/money/business/2020/08/20/racism-black-america-corporate-america-facebook-
apple-netflix-nike-diversity/5557003002/.  
33 Fuhrmans, supra note 30. 





ethnically diverse individuals faring similarly as nine percent of the Fortune 
500 CEO population.34 
 
Source: The Wall Street Journal 
 
As with corporate boards, researchers have identified exclusion from 
professional networks as a key driver of the imbalance in C-suites.  
Networking—and socializing—can make or break careers, and women and 
minorities can find it difficult to integrate into dominant corporate cultures and 
participate on equal footing with their white male colleagues.  As a result, they 
are often unable to fully develop the relationships necessary for advancement.35  
The consequences can be important.  Promotions in many companies are 
informally decided before jobs are ever posted, leaving members from 
underrepresented groups without the chance to compete, and without sponsors 
in the corporate leadership to put their name forward.36   
Inadequate opportunities for advancement at earlier stages of careers 
play a role as well.  CEOs, recruiters and scholars routinely report that women 
and Black professionals face greater obstacles early in their career, including 
work-life balance and family responsibilities, and are viewed more critically 
than their colleagues.37  And even if minorities and women make it close to the 
C-suite, they are rarely given the profit-and-loss positions that serve as 
stepping stones to the top jobs like CEO and CFO, and are instead more 
typically placed into roles such as marketing or human resources.38 A similar 
challenge faces women.  A Wall Street Journal study of executives at the 
biggest publicly traded firms by market value, shows that men occupying the 
most senior jobs in companies overwhelmingly get the management jobs in 
which a company’s profits and losses hang in the balance.39  Women by 
contrast often fill roles such as head of human resources, administration or 
legal, the jobs that don’t have profit-generating responsibility, and that  are not 
usually routes to running a company.40 
 For non-white women, climbing the corporate ladder is even more 
difficult.41 In a 2019 survey of 329 major companies and more than 68,000 of 
their employees, women of color were less likely to say their bosses gave them 
opportunities to manage people and projects or helped them navigate corporate 
	
34 Id. at 2 (women comprise only 25% of all Fortune 100 C-Suite positions, with racially 
diverse individuals comprising only 16% of the Fortune 100 executive positions). 
35 Te-Ping Chen, supra note 26. 
36 Te-Ping Chen, supra note 26. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Fuhrmans, supra note 30. 
40 Id. 
41 Lisa Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of Corporate Boards: Women, People of 
Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women of Color, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV., 
1105, 1116, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921037 (stating that 
non-white women “describe barriers to their success as a ‘concrete’ ceiling, as opposed to 
the ‘glass’ ceiling experienced by white women”).  





politics.42  They made up just 4% of C-suite roles, according to the research by 
McKinsey & Co. and LeanIn.Org, a nonprofit that promotes the advancement 





In the end, an increasingly steep decoupling of white men from 
virtually all other groups arises as one moves up the corporate ladder.  What is 
an initially modest gap in representation at the entry level of hiring arising 
between white men on the one hand, and women and minorities on the other, 
jumps at every step across the corporate hierarchy.  This demographic 
decoupling culminates in C-Suite figures that do not come close to representing 
the demographics of the United States.44  Instead, minorities and women lose 
ground as white men, predominately from relatively affluent backgrounds,45 
gain an ever greater share of corporate leadership positions. 
 
 C. Corporate Law’s Post-George Floyd, Pandemic Moment  
 
Corporate America’s demographic dilemma has attracted attention for 
decades, though scrutiny of the problem has intensified  since the brutal death 
of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police. The tragedy not only 
	
42 Amber Burton, Women of Color: Invisible, Excluded, and Constantly ‘On Guard,’ WALL 
ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/women-of-color-invisible-
excluded-and-constantly-on-guard-11571112060?mod=article_inline. 
43 Id. 
44 Women in the Workplace 2002, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, 8, https://wiw-
report.s3.amazonaws.com/Women_in_the_Workplace_2020.pdf (the 2020 report focuses 
specifically on how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected women at work, including the 
unique impact on women of different races and ethnicities). 
45 Richard L. Zweigenhaft, “Diversity Among CEOs and Corporate Directors: Has the 
Heyday Come and Gone?”, Who Rules America?, December 2013, 
https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/diversity_among_ceos.html (closely examining 
corporate directors at elite companies and finding that they were overwhelmingly from 
upper class or upper middle class backgrounds, including directors who were female or 
from non-Black minority groups).	





supercharged the then nascent Black Lives Matter movement, but it also 
highlighted an array of societal inequities, from police brutality to the racial 
wealth and income gaps.  As activists have delved into questions of legal 
meaning and entitlement, and democracy, a natural point of emphasis has been 
the racially disparate allocation of resources and opportunity in society.46  The 
pandemic’s  unequal impact on people of color47 has only doubled down on the 
focus, leading to an epistemic shift—or “Great Awakening”—in American 
consciousness.48  	
 Thus, the cruel events of 2020 made ignoring racial inequality 
impossible for most Americans, and especially for high-profile business 
leaders.49  The facts on the ground led to new questions being asked of 
corporations about their role in contributing to the undeniable problem of 
persistent inequality and what actions they may and should take to address it.  
And for the first time, a mainstream conversation has arisen as to what the 
relative lack of Diversity has meant for not only Blacks, but also for society—
	
46 See Veronica Root Martinez and Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equity Metrics, Yale L.J. Forum 
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3772895 
(observing that under the Black Lives movement “conversations that initially focused on 
the appropriate role of police within American society turned into debates about, quite 
simply, everything”).  The picture that emerges according to an extensive review of George 
Floyd’s life based on hundreds of documents and interviews is one that underscores how 
systemic racism has calcified within many of America’s institutions, creating sharply 
disparate outcomes in housing, education, the economy, law enforcement, and health care. 
Toluse Olorunnipa & Griff Witte, Born with two strikes, How systemic racism shaped 
Floyd’s life and hobbled his ambition, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/george-floyd-america/systemic-
racism/. 
47 For an important summary of the economic and health effects of the pandemic on Black 
workers, see Elise Gould & Valerie Wilson, Black Workers Face Two of the Most Lethal 
Preexisting Conditions for Coronavirus—Racism and Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 
1, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/.  Women, especially 
Black, non-Hispanic women and Latinas, were also hit hard by the pandemic, as they are 
overrepresented in sectors, such as the hospitality and retail sectors, that experienced the 
brunt of pandemic-related job losses. Jasmine Tucker and Claire Ewing-Nelson, COVID-
19 Is Making Women’s Economic Situation Even Worse, National Women’s Law Center 
(September 2020) (https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/PulsedataFS-1.pdf).	
48 Van Jones, Welcome to the ’Great Awakening’, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/12/opinions/great-awakening-empathy-solidarity-george-
floyd-jones/index.html (observing how George Floyd’s killing, and the Black Lives Matter 
movement  have birthed a “phenomenon infinitely larger than itself” best described as a 
“Great Awakening of empathy and solidarity, one without historical precedent”); see also 
Jose A. Del Real, et al., How the Black Lives Matter movement went mainstream, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/how-the-black-lives-matter-movement-went-
mainstream/2020/06/09/201bd6e6-a9c6-11ea-9063-e69bd6520940_story.html (noting 
that the mainstreaming of the Black Lives movement is happening against the backdrop of 
a global pandemic that, in the United States, has disproportionately hurt minorities). 
49 See Natalie Sherman, George Floyd: Why are companies speaking up this time?, BBC 
(June 6, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52896265 (“[F]or years, black deaths 
in the hands of police have gone unremarked in corporate America.  But this time, as 
protesters pour into streets across the country set off by the killing of George Floyd, 
businesses are speaking out.”). 





and whether corporate governance might have a role in promoting more 
constructive corporate behavior. 
This is not to say that there have not been scholars with an eye on what 
social externalities an absence of corporate Diversity creates.  Research has 
found, for example, that corporations with less Diversity and fewer women are 
less likely to engage in philanthropic giving.50  Similarly, recent events have 
highlighted how corporations with fewer powerful African Americans and 
Latinos on their boards and in their workforces are less likely to support causes 
relevant to Diverse communities—or to take social justice stands that reflect 
the values of diverse minority communities.51  Even attention to issues like 
equitable environmental policy may be less likely where corporate boards and 
management lack Diversity and the attendant perspective to recognize 
problems and optimize solutions.52  
Still, what are perhaps the most direct and concerning implications of 
the data are the larger macroeconomic repercussions for the country’s racial 
wealth and income gaps.  In the decades since the height of the civil rights 
movement, corporate America has failed to consistently hire and promote 
women and historically underrepresented minorities, stalling many from rising 
	
50 See Robert J. Williams, Women on Corporate Boards of Directors and Their Influence 
on Corporate Philanthropy, 42 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 1 (2003) (supporting the notion that firms 
having a higher proportion of women serving on their boards do engage in charitable giving 
to a greater extent than firms having a lower proportion of women serving on their boards). 
51 The most obvious, and studied, recent case in point concerns the disparate NBA and NFL 
responses to Colin Kaepernick’s protest of the Flag, where the NBA—where economic 
power is wielded by Black players—embraced social protests, and where the NFL—where 
economic power is wielded by white owners—largely eschewed them and ostracized  
Kaepernick for his demonstration.  See, e.g., Michael Conklin & Christine Noel, 
Unsportsmanlike Conduct? The NFL’s Response to the Kneeling Controversy, 12 J. 
ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES (2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3626675 (noting the higher 
percentage of Black players in the N.B.A. and the larger number of Black viewers). See 
also John Branch, Why the NFL and the NBA Are So Far Apart on Social Justice Stances,  
N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/sports/nfl-nba-social-
justice-protests.html (noting that the NFL’s lack of guaranteed contracts to the NBA’s 
smaller and more unified workforce, where Black players are marketed, resulted in vastly 
different corporate responses).   
52 The same issue is under intense scrutiny in the nonprofit sector, where there are parallels.  
See Ambika Chawla, A Look at Why Environmentalism is So Homogeneous (July 28, 
2020), https://ensia.com/features/environmental-workforce-diversity-systemic-racism/ 
(noting that “people of color can offer unique perspectives on both why diversity is lacking 
in the green sector and what organizations can do to diversify the environmental 
workforce”).  See  also  Victoria Bortfeld, This ‘Green’ Space Shouldn’t Be So White, 
https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2020/08/21/environmental-sciences-anti-racism/ (noting 
that “the institutional settings and professional workplaces that house and advance 
environmental work in some ways mirror the environmental injustices that unfold in our 
society”).  See also Ihab Mikati, Adam F. Benson, Thomas J. Luben, Jason D Sacks, and 
Jennifer Richmond-Bryant, Disparities in Distribution of Particulate Matter Emission 
Sources by Race and Poverty Status, 108 AM. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 480 (2018) (finding 
that people of color are not only much more likely to live near polluters and breathe 
polluted air, but also that race has a stronger effect on exposure to pollutants than poverty, 
which indicates that something beyond the concentration of poverty among Black and 
Brown communities is at play).  





above middle management.53  The absence of diversity at the top of 
corporations is widely accepted in the organizational psychology literature as 
one key factor likely impeding diversity lower down the corporate hierarchy, 
where the bulk of employees work and the most interactions between the 
corporation, customers, and community occur.54  The reasons are varied, but 
generally start with hiring. Individuals, regardless of race, tend to like 
individuals who are similar to themselves and evaluate them more positively 
than those who are different.  Because of this “affinity bias,” managers may 
repeatedly favor individuals who are similar to themselves, viewing them as 
more trustworthy, intelligent or qualified.55  Meanwhile, women, and 
especially Black and Brown candidates, may be subject to “outsider bias,” the 
idea that those not part of a known circle of friends and associates must have 
values and interests foreign to your own.56  In business, this and other affinity-
based biases can have an especially large impact during the recruitment 
processes, where it presents itself as a lack of “culture fit,” an ambiguous 
evaluation employed to disqualify job candidates.57 Perhaps not surprisingly, 
data from the National Academy of Sciences indicate that the rate of callbacks 
for Black candidates is generally lower than that of white candidates, and this 
rate has changed little since the 1970s.58 
	
53 As of July 15, 2020, less than 2% of the 279 top executives at the 50 largest companies 
in the United States were Black. Guynn & Schrotenboaer, supra note 32. For a recent 
survey and analysis of the racial wealth gap, see Neil Bhutta, Andrew C. Chang, Lisa J. 
Dettling, and Joanne W. Hsu, Disparities in Wealth by Race and Ethnicity in the 2019 
Survey of Consumer Finances, FEDS NOTES (Sept. 28, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/disparities-in-wealth-by-race-
and-ethnicity-in-the-2019-survey-of-consumer-finances-20200928.htm. 
54 See Jill A. Gould, Carol T. Kulik, & Shruti R. Sardeshmukh, Trickle-down effect: The 
impact of female board members on executive gender diversity, 57 HUMAN RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT 931 (2018) (finding a trickle-down effect on female representation 
operating between the board and executive levels). See generally Rachel W. Flam, 
Jeremiah Green, Joshua A. Lee, and Nathan Y. Sharp, A Level Playing Field? Empirical 
Evidence That Minority Analysts Face Unequal Access to Corporate Managers (June 8, 
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3622417 (finding that ethnic 
minority analysts face unique barriers to management access).  
55 Adwoa Bagalini, 3 cognitive biases perpetuating systemic racism at work - and how to 
overcome them, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/08/cognitive-bias-unconscious-racism-moral-
licensing/ (highlighting how moral licensing, affinity bias, and confirmation bias are three 
types of cognitive biases that factor into producing unequal outcomes for people of color). 
56 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 
J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (showing that individuals disproportionately stick 
with the status quo through a series of decision-making experiments); see also Amy 
Kristof-Brown, Murray R. Barrick, & Melinda Franke, Applicant Impression 
Management: Dispositional Influences and Consequences For Recruiter Perceptions of 
Fit and Similarity, 28 J. MGMT. 27, 33–40 (2002) (offering evidence that when making 
hiring decisions, interviewers will unconsciously favor candidates whom they see as 
similar to themselves). 
57 Bagalini, supra note 55. 
58 Lincoln Quillian, Devah Pager, Arnfinn H. Midtbøen, & Ole Hexel, Hiring 
Discrimination Against Black Americans Hasn’t Declined in 25 Years, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Oct. 11, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/hiring-discrimination-against-black-americans-





Similar dynamics complicate the promotion of those Black and Brown 
people who are hired. “Confirmation bias,” the human tendency to selectively 
seek out, favor, and use information that confirms what you already believe, 
can in non-Diverse contexts stymie the progress of Black and Brown 
employees.59  To the extent white leaders60 of a firm expect Black employees 
to be less qualified, they will likely be more inclined to ignore new information 
proving otherwise, even where performance is high.61  Employees who come 
from underrepresented groups are consequently more likely to be negatively 
evaluated.  Additionally, mentors and promoters at firms who may be 
positioned to elevate junior and mid-level executives to positions of leadership 
may be disinclined to do so.62  For underrepresented groups, this means they 
may face competitive disadvantages vis-á-vis their white counterparts for 
promotion.  
Another large factor impeded progress toward racial and gender 
equality.  With an increased emphasis on short-term stockholder returns from 
institutional investors starting  in the 1980s and accelerating since, the share of 
corporate profits that went into wage increases plummeted compared to 
previous generations.63  This decline in fair gainsharing hit Black Americans 
particularly hard, because they had only gained labor rights in the 1960s, and 
were more likely to be working and lower middle class.64  Growing inequality 
	
hasnt-declined-in-25-years (finding little evidence that conscious and unconscious forms 
of bias will diminish on their own). 
59 Bagalini, supra note 55. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974) (discussing 
“anchoring” as one of several key judgmental heuristics and the biases it produces). 
60 Or even minority leaders, given the evidence that implicit bias affects everyone, 
including Black people’s perceptions of other Black people.  Theodore R. Johnson, Black-
on-Black Racism: The Hazards of Implicit Bias, Dec. 26, 2014, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/black-on-black-racism-the-hazards-
of-implicit-bias/384028/ (“When blacks are asked about their predilections, they express a 
solid preference for their group over whites, but, in general, performance on the Implicit 
Association Test [an implicit bias test used by Project Implicit] suggests they 
subconsciously hold a slight preference for whites over blacks.”). 	
61 Bagalini, supra note 55. 
62 Id. 
63 Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis:  
An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American Economy NBER Working Paper 
27193, https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193’; Lawrence Mishel, The Decline in Unions 
Has Hurt Nonunion Workers Too, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 1, 2016); Lawrence Mishel & 
Jori Kandra, CEO Compensation Surged 14% in 2019 to $21.3 Million, Econ. Pol’y Inst. 
(Aug. 18, 2020) (observing that as stockholders have tied CEO pay to stock returns, CEO 
compensation has increased while worker wages have stagnated); Lawrence Mishel, Lynn 
Rhinehart, and Lane Windham, Explaining The Erosion of Private-Sector Unions, ECON. 
POL’Y INST. (Oct. 7, 2020), https://files.epi.org/pdf/211305.pdf; Josh Bivens, Lawrence 
Mishel & John Schmitt, It’s Not Just Monopoly and Monopsony:  How Market Power Has 
Affected American Wages, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://files.epi.org/pdf/145564.pdf.	
64 See David Leonhardt, The Black-White Wage Gap Is As Big As It Was in the 1950s, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 06/25/opinion/sunday/race-
wage-gap.html (documenting that both the racial wealth and income gaps shrank after 
World War II because of rising wages due to strong unions, the inclusion of formerly 





resulted for all Americans, and the gains made by Black Americans during the 
period when the New Deal/Great Society consensus was in place began to 
reverse.65 Public policy movements in the Friedman/Reagan direction also 
freed corporations from pressure to address DEI issues more assertively, a 
reality evidenced by the lack of progress in diversifying the boardroom and C-
Suite. 
Collectively, these obstacles are all widely understood to contribute to 
sprawling differences in economic outcomes and opportunities, a key concern 
of civil rights activists.  Statistics compiled by the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission in 2018 indicate that among white people, the ratio 
of lower-paid service workers and laborers compared with higher-paid senior-
level management is roughly 7 to 1.  But for Black people, the ratio balloons 
to 105 to 1.66  
These facts have a direct impact on racial wealth and income 
inequality.  The net worth in 2016 of the typical white family ($171,000) was 
nearly 10 times greater than that of a Black family ($17,150).  Meanwhile, the 
gulf in median household incomes between white and Black Americans has 
grown after the Reagan era, with improvements during the 1960s and 1970s 
being reversed, so that the gap of $23,800 in 1970 has now grown to roughly 
$33,000 in 2018 (as measured in 2018 dollars).67  Part of the gulf can be 
attributed to what has been described as the “Black Ceiling” that cuts career 
progression early.  According to recent industry analysis, Black males reach 
	
excluded jobs that many Black workers held at the minimum wage by the Great Society 
legislation in 1966, and other policies that benefited all blue-collar workers, but that these 
gains then reversed from the 1980s forward); William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and 
Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, https://whorulesamerica.ucsc.edu/power/wealth.html 
(showing that Black people are far behind white people in income and that the income gap 
is growing); Kristin McIntosh, et al., Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-
black-white-wealth-gap/ (showing that the huge wealth and income gap disfavoring Black 
Americans is growing). See generally Facts: Racial Economic Inequality, 
INEQUALITY.ORG, https://inequality.org/facts/racial-inequality/ (documenting that the 
median Black family had net wealth of only $3,500 compared to white median family 
wealth of $147,000, and that this gap has grown considerably since the early 1980s); Philip 
Mattena, Grand Theft Paycheck: The Large Corporations Shortcoming Their Workers’ 
Wages, GOOD JOBS FIRST AND JOBS WITH JUSTICE EDUCATION FUND, June 2018 
(documenting that wage theft affects Black and Latino workers disproportionately as they 
are overrepresented in the sectors that are the most penalized by courts for wage theft). 	
65 Equality in the United States, including for Black Americans, was rising up until the 
Reagan Administration reversed the New Deal/Great Society consensus. See generally The 
Productivity–Pay Gap, ECON. POL’Y INST. (July 2019).	
66 Guynn & Schrotenboaer, supra note 32. 
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their peak incomes much sooner than white males, at lower levels ($43,859 at 
ages 45-19 for Blacks and $66,250 for white males).68   
For all these reasons, there are increasing calls by advocates and by 
corporate stakeholders themselves for corporations to address inequality by 
undertaking more assertive and more comprehensive DEI policies that address 
all the important ways in which corporations affect their workers, consumers, 
business partners, communities of operation, and society as a whole.   These 
demands are not just for symbolic actions, but for a top down, and bottom up 
approach that embeds a commitment to equality in all aspects of corporate 
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following George Floyd’s death) [hereinafter DayBlink Report]; Peter Eavis, Want More 
Diversity? Some Experts Say Reward C.E.O.s for It, N.Y. TIMES (July 14. 2020), 
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compensation.html (reporting that just 78 of roughly 3,000 companies said fulfilling 
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Corporate Silence and Anti-Racism, FSG (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.fsg.org/blog/corporate-silence-anti-racism (advocating for such meetings as 
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2019)(statement of The Business Roundtable redefining the purpose of a corporation to 
promote “an economy that serves all Americans” and in doing so moving away from 
shareholder primacy to include a commitment to all stakeholders); Lauren Weber, 
Companies Have Promised $35 Billion Toward Racial Equity. Where Is the Money 
Going?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-have-
promised-billions-toward-racial-equity-where-is-the-money-going-11608570864; Judith 
Crown, Supplier diversity needs to focus on industries of today and tomorrow, CRAIN’S 
CHI. BUS. (Dec. 18, 2020, 7:26 AM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/equity/supplier-
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II.   DIVERSITY AND ITS CONNECTION TO  SUSTAINABLE FIRM 
PROFITABILITY AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
	
For all of the attention now directed at DEI in Corporate America—
and, as we shall later see, an increasing legislative and regulatory 
preoccupation with the diversity of corporate boards—Diversity is not usually 
talked about in terms of its relationship to longstanding corporate law 
principles.  For those adopting the view of Milton Friedman, the pursuit of 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion is most commonly understood as an external 
matter to the firm, unassociated with shareholder profits, and that should be 
addressed by external regulatory law, not internal corporate action. Notably, 
this understanding of Diversity is not entirely incongruous with that of many 
Diversity supporters to the extent to which they view corporate Diversity as 
part and parcel of social justice and fairness—and not (necessarily) a matter 
relevant to firm-level performance.70 Indeed, for some activists, associating 
Diversity with business concepts like profits inherently cheapens the moral 
imperative for reform.   
Although we are sensitive to this latter argument, and agree entirely 
with the strong moral imperatives behind Diversity, the case for Diversity has 
also had a strong business rationale for many years. That rationale has only 
grown stronger as societal concerns about equity and inclusion have entered 
the social and political mainstream at a breathtaking pace after last year’s 
conscience-raising.  Generational moral moments like the one in which we find 
ourselves have  economic and  legal repercussions for corporations which, as 
we highlight later in the Article, also offer a corresponding scope for moral 
action protected by the business judgment rule, especially when that action also 
makes good business sense. 
But first, in this Section, we canvass the most cited building blocks of 
the business case for Diversity and its connection to firm success and long-term 
value.  We start with a survey of the empirical research associating Diversity 
with financial performance, and find a mixed picture, albeit one that is still 
important  for corporate decisionmakers considering whether and to what 
extent to focus on DEI.  We then turn our analysis to comparatively stronger 
qualitative and analytical arguments from the long-running literature in 
organizational psychology identifying cognitive diversity (and Diversity more 
generally) as a key ingredient for cognitively “smart” businesses.  We then end 
with what is, in our view, the easiest way to understand the business argument 
for Diversity—its impact on the corporation’s reputation with regulators and 
all its key stakeholders, and thus and by extension, on its  cost of capital, access 
to talent and business partners, and its attractiveness to customers.  Taken in 
total, this Section thus details what is most critical for the connection between 
	
70 See Aaron A. Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm: 
Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN’S L. J. 569, 591–99 
(2010) (reviewing studies).  Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Corporate Board 
Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate 
Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795 (noting that where rationales for diversity move away from 
moral or social justifications, those rationales may be wrongly interpreted as an 
acknowledgment of the illegitimacy of moral and social justifications). 





corporate law and DEI:  the rational basis for business leaders to conclude that 
attention to good DEI practices makes good business sense in terms of 
improving the likelihood that a corporation will be sustainably profitable. 
	
A. The Empirical Debate 
 
We start first with the numbers. Although Diversity has not been a 
focus of critical inquiry within  corporate law, it has attracted substantial 
interest from scholars interested in its impact on the financial performance of 
businesses.  This literature is extensive, and can be summarized, albeit  
somewhat crudely, into two categories: i) recent studies from a growing 
number of researchers whose work suggests that diversity has a positive impact 
on financial performance; and ii) studies, typically less recent, that find the 
evidence to be more ambiguous, or even conflicted.  We begin  with examples 
from the first category. 
Some of the most highly cited work finding a positive relationship 
between Diversity and investment has come from top-tier financial services 
firms and consultants.  The Carlyle Group, for example, has observed that its 
portfolio companies that had two or more diverse directors—where diverse 
directors were defined as female, Black, Hispanic or Asian—had on average 
earnings growth of 12.3% over the previous three years, compared to 0.5% 
among portfolio companies with no diverse directors.71  McKinsey, too, has 
found that corporations with the most ethnically diverse executive teams are 
33% more likely to outperform corporations with the least ethnically diverse 
teams in terms of profitability.  Similarly, a Citi report finds that companies in 
the top quartile for both gender and ethnic diversity are 12% more likely to be 
more profitable than companies in the lower quartiles and that the gap 
increased by 36% compared to companies in the fourth quartile.72  In addition 
to Diversity, Deloitte’s research highlights the importance of Inclusion, what 
it describes as the feeling of being treated “equitably and with respect” and 
“feeling valued and belonging,”73 in increasing performance.74 The research 
finds that organizations with inclusive cultures are twice as likely to meet or 
exceed financial goals, three times as likely to be high performing, six times 
more likely to be innovative and eight times more likely to achieve better 
business outcomes.75  
	
71	Jason Thomas & Meg Starr, THE CARLYLE GROUP, Global Insights: From Impacting 
Investing to Investing for Impact, 5 (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.carlyle.com/sites/default/files/2020-
02/From%20Impact%20Investing%20to%20Investing%20for%20Impact_022420.pdf 
(analyzing Carlyle U.S. portfolio company data, February 2020).	
72 Citi GPS, supra note 68.	
73 Id.	
74 Juliet Bourke and Bernadette Dillon, The diversity and inclusion revolution, DELOITTE 
REVIEW, January 2018.	
75 Id.	





Perhaps the largest body of research has focused on gender.76	Credit 
Suisse’s Research Institute has, for example, found over a series of studies that 
companies with at least one woman on the board had on average a sector-
adjusted return on equity of 12.2%, compared to 10.1% for companies with no 
female directors.77  It also found in 2013 price-to-book values of 2.4x for 
companies with female representation on their boards versus only 1.8x for 
those without, and a nine-year average for boards with women directors of 2.3x 
versus only 1.8x for companies with all-male boards.78  Similarly, MSCI 
observed in an analysis of director seats held by women over a five-year period 
in four global indexes that once U.S. companies achieved a “tipping point” of 
at least three women on their board, they experienced median gains in return 
on equity of 10% and earnings per share of 37%.79  Meanwhile, companies that 
had no female directors showed reductions in return on equity of -1%, and 
reductions of -8% in EPS over the same five-year period.80  Catalyst, a 
nonprofit advocacy group, likewise found in a series of reports comparing of 
groups of firms that differed in the gender diversity of their corporate boards, 
that companies with three or more women on their boards outperformed 
companies with none by 46% in terms of their return on equity.81  Other 
industry studies make similar claims.82 
	
76 This is in part, we suspect, because of the seemingly boundless data available to be 
culled:  women are, after all, everywhere, and in greater numbers than, say, African 
Americans, who may be concentrated in a few select countries.	
77 Credit Suisse, The CS Gender 3000: Women in Senior Management 16 (Sept. 2014), pg. 
16, https://directwomen.org/sites/default/files/news-pdfs/9.pdf.	
78 Id.	
79 Meggin Thwing Eastman et al., MSCI, The tipping point: Women on boards and 
financial performance 3 (December 2016), 
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/fd1f8228-cc07-4789-acee-3f9ed97ee8bb 
(analyzing of U.S. companies that were constituents of the MSCI World Index for the 
entire period from July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2016).	
80 Id.	
81 Harvey M. Wagner, CATALYST, The Bottom Line: Corporate Performance and 
Women’s Representation on Boards (2004–2008) (Mar. 1, 2011), 
https://www.catalyst.org/research/the-bottom-line-corporate-performance-and-
womensrepresentation-on-boards-2004-2008/ (analyzing gender diversity data from 
Catalyst’s annual Fortune 500 Census of Women Board Directors report series for the years 
2005 to 2009, and corresponding financial data from S&P’s Compustat database for the 
years 2004 to 2008).	
82 McKinsey (2020) found “a positive, statistically significant correlation between 
company financial outperformance and [board] diversity, on the dimensions of both gender 
and ethnicity,” with companies in the top quartile for board gender diversity “28 percent 
more likely than their peers to outperform financially,” and a statistically significant 
correlation between board gender diversity and outperformance on earnings before interest 
and taxation margin. See McKinsey & Company, Diversity wins: How inclusion matters 
13 (May 2020), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Diversity%20and%
20Inclusion/Diversity%20wins%20How%20inclusion%20matters/Diversity-wins-How-
inclusion-mattersvF.pdf (analyzing 1,039 companies across 15 countries for the period 
from December 2018 to November 2019). Moody’s (2019) found that greater board gender 
diversity is associated with higher credit ratings, with women accounting for an average of 





Some Research from the academy has echoed these findings.   A 
Harvard study found that venture capital firms that increased their proportion 
of female partner hires by 10% saw, on average, a 1.5% spike in overall fund 
returns each year and had 9.7% more profitable exits—a deceptively 
impressive figure given that only 28.8% of all VC investments have a 
profitable exit.83  Meanwhile, other studies from scholars at Oklahoma State 
University have found significant positive relationships between the fraction 
of women or minorities on the board and firm value after controlling for size, 
industry, and other corporate governance measures of Fortune 1000 firms.84 
Yet another inquiry studying performance data and the percentage of women 
and minorities on boards of directors for 127 large U.S. companies in 1993 and 
1998 found the percentage of Caucasian females plus ethnic minority directors 
on the board to be positively related to both return on equity and return on 
assets.85 
But, as we highlighted,  a second set of studies exist that has not found 
the same positive empirical results.  For example, an international team of 
academic researchers in Germany found in a metanalysis of literature from 20 
studies covering 3,097 companies that female representation on corporate 
boards has a “small and non-significant” relationship with a company’s 
financial performance.86 Moreover, they found that firm financial performance 
is not directly related, but depends on moderators, such as board size or the 
time of data collection.87  Similarly, another team (including one of the 
Oklahoma researchers who had previously observed a positive relationship in 
terms of gender and firm value) found in its analysis of 541 S&P 500 
companies from 1998-2002 that financial performance had no relationship to 
gender diversity or ethnic minority diversity, positive or negative, when 
Tobin’s Q was used as the measure of financial performance.88  
	
28% of board seats at Aaa-rated companies but less than 5% of board seats at Ca-rated 
companies.  See Moody’s Investors Service, Gender diversity is correlated with higher 
ratings, but mandates pose short-term risk 2 (Sept. 11, 2019), 
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84 See, e.g., David Carter, et al., The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Firm 
Financial Performance (Mar. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstr 
act=972763.  See also David Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and 
Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003) (finding  that Tobin’s Q is positively related to both 
the percentage of female directors and the percentage of minority directors).	
85 Niclas L. Erhardt et al., Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 
11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 102 (2003).	
86 Jan Luca Pletzer et al., Does Gender Matter? Female Representation on Corporate 
Boards and Firm Financial Performance – A Meta-Analysis 1, PLOS One (June 18, 2015).	
87 Id., supra note 86.	
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Other studies offer more nuanced appraisals and are at times highly 
critical of the methodologies employed in the studies cited by Diversity 
advocates. Alice Eagly, in particular, has criticized studies like those produced 
by Catalyst and Credit Suisse for not revealing the strength of the relation 
between the participation of women and financial success and for lacking 
correlations relating the percentages of women on corporate boards to 
corporate outcomes or simple scatter plots of the relationships.89  She also 
criticizes early studies for not raising questions about reverse causation from 
financial success to the inclusion of women and possible confounding of the 
percentage of women on boards with omitted variables.90  Consequently, a 
number of unacknowledged correlations could be driving the data such as 
company resources derived from performance and an ability to invest in 
diversity.91  Along similar lines, Renee B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira criticize 
previous studies that are not robust to endogeneity, and find in their analysis of 
nearly 2,000 S&P mid- and small caps from 1996 to 2003 that that gender 
diversity can add to shareholder value, but generally only where governance is 
weak.92  Likewise, Corrine Post and Kris Byron find a “near zero” relationship 
with a company’s market performance, but a positive relationship with a 
company’s accounting returns.93  The U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
	
89 Alice H. Eagly, When Passionate Advocates Meet Research on 
Diversity, Does the Honest Broker Stand a Chance?, 72 J. SOC. ISSUES 199, 200 (2016), 
https://www.psychologie.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:94328113-6e62-4545-80a5-
9c2ac865c95d/Eagly-2016-Journal_of_Social_Issues.pdf (noting that few researchers of 
the connection between diversity and firm performance have addressed endogeneity in a 
manner that allows claims about causation). 	
90 Eagly, supra note 89 at 202.	
91 For an overview and commentary, see Aaron Dhir, Challenging Boardroom 
Homogeneity (2015); Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through 
Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 432 n.1 (2008), at 432–
33 (reviewing the studies); Aaron A. Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious 
Conception of the Firm: Canadian Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 
QUEEN’S L. J. 569, 591–99 (2010) (reviewing studies); Sabina Nielsen et al., Board 
Diversity and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of the Mediating Effects of 
Board Processes and Task Performance (Acad. of Mgmt. Proceedings, No. 14,474, 2008), 
http://www.ebscohost.com/academic business-source-premier (accessible through fee-
based membership).	
92 Renee B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira, Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009) (analyzing 1,939 S&P 500, 
S&P MidCaps, and S&P SmallCap companies for the period 1996 to 2003, measuring 
company performance by a proxy for Tobin’s Q (the ratio of market value to book value) 
and return on assets).	
93 Corinne Post and Kris Byron, Women on Boards and Firm Financial Performance: A 
Meta-Analysis 1 (2014). In 2016, the same authors, based on a review of the results for 87 
studies, “found that board gender diversity is weakly but significantly positively correlated 
with [corporate social responsibility],” although they noted that “a significant correlational 
relationship does not prove causality.”  Corinne Post and Kris Byron, Women on Boards 
of Directors and Corporate Social Performance: A Meta‐Analysis, 24(4) Corp. 
Governance: An Int’l Rev. 428 (July 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12165.	





meanwhile, has concluded that the mixed nature of various academic studies 
may be due to differences in methodologies, data samples and time periods.94 
Conflicting assessments like these can invite paralysis and uncertainty 
and thus it is easy, but we think wrong,  to interpret the overall direction of the 
literature as collectively taking the conversation on Diversity “nowhere.”  
Working with incomplete and imperfect data is the job of most corporate 
leaders. CEOs and boards make decisions every day with very little 
information, and often without the benefits charts or regressions (whatever 
their statistical or scientific robustness).  And in doing so, they take whatever 
data are available, discount them, and apply that information to the particulars 
of the firm they manage, and then act.  That is why the business judgment rule 
in large part exists, to ensure that business leaders can proceed with confidence 
that their good faith decisions in a world of uncertainty are not second-guessed 
in litigation, with the counterproductive effect of deterring them from 
managing their businesses in an effective manner.95 
From this standpoint, it is worthwhile noting that there are several  
studies suggesting that, at a minimum, diversity may have a positive impact on 
the financial operations of a company.  And CEOs and boards are, in a world 
of incomplete information, entitled to also take into account the studies by 
firms— paid to assist them in making their companies more profitable —that 
take the clear position that  that effective DEI policies are  positively associated 
with protecting and improving firm  value.  This may not mean much to  
academics, who may consider the views of business consultants and investment 
banks to lack empirical rigor, and to not have controlled for all variables, 
especially when  contrary evidence may also exist.  But it is important for 
decisionmakers, and for that matter, the operation of  corporate law, a point we 
will return to in our detailed discussion later of the business judgment rule.  For 
now, suffice it to say when faced with the body of the empirical work done 
thus far, a CEO and board could rationally conclude that, whatever the 
literature’s weaknesses, it shows that a business case for Diversity is present.  
And the ability for the CEO and the board to do so rationally has enormous 
stakes for the legal protections and discretion that they will have in terms of 
the actions taken on that assessment. 
Of course, corporate policy cannot be made in a vacuum consisting of 
only statistically validated and replicated studies that dictate with certainty the 
direction to take.  Corporate leaders cannot wait for an academic consensus 
	
94 United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Ranking Member, 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on 
Financial Services, House of Representatives, Corporate Boards: Strategies to Address 
Representation of Women Include Federal Disclosure Requirements 5 (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674008.pdf (noting that research on the impact of gender 
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defined and what methodologies were used”). 	
95 E.g., Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313-314 (Del. 2015) 
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with more information (in the case of directors) or an actual economic stake in the outcome 
(in the case of informed, disinterested stockholders)”).	





about a complex issue in a fast-changing world in which action is required in 
the here and now.  They are expected to make the best judgment they can based 
on the information available to them, however imprecise and imperfect.  In that 
calculus, they may also consider factors rationally contributing to the business 
case for Diversity, factors like societal expectations and their corresponding 
consequences for corporate value and reputation, which they understand as a 
matter of  lived experience,  both as citizens and business professionals.	
 
 B. Governance and Risk Management 
 
In a world of limited quantitative evidence, analytical arguments 
bolstered by organizational theory and case studies have emerged as important 
building blocks substantiating the business case for diversity.  For decades, 
organizational psychologists have held that cognitive diversity, properly 
constructed, can lead to superior problem solving and execution in groups and 
businesses.96  Cognitive diversity can be understood as the variance among 
people in terms of their perspective and how they process information—
whether it be in terms of decisionmaking, conflict resolution, problem analysis 
or problem solving.97  It is not necessarily predicted by factors such as gender, 
ethnicity, or age, though each of those factors can and often do shape the ways 
members of that group process information as compared to others outside the 
group.98 
One of the most popular use case applications for cognitive diversity 
in the business literature is in corporate governance. Corporate governance 
manages the conflicts that arise among shareholders, boards and managers.  In 
doing so, it enables an efficient flow of information and rigor among 
decisionmakers,99 increases transparency and accountability so that 
	
96 Lynne Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 
76 TUL. L. REV. [1363], 1391 (2002). The organizational literature has long suggested that 
heterogeneous groups tend to improve the quality of thinking where complex 
decisionmaking requires creativity and judgment.  See generally Susan E. Jackson, 
Consequences of Group Composition for the Interpersonal Dynamics of Strategic Issue 
Processing, 8 ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC MGMT. 345, 354-56 (1992); Alan C. Filley, et. al, 
MANAGERIAL PROCESS AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (1976).  See also Taylor H. Cox, 
Sharon A. Lobel, & Poppy Lauretta McLeod, Effects of Ethnic and Group Cultural 
Differences on Cooperative and Competitive Behavior on a Group Task, 34(4) ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 827 (1991) (finding superior problem-solving skills by groups with more ethnic 
diversity); Janet Sniezek & Rebecca A. Henry, Accuracy and confidence in group 
judgment, 43 STAN. ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 20 (1989) (finding that 
“the more disagreements that group members reported, the more accurate were their group 
judgments”); David Rock & Heidi Grant, Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter.  
97 Alison Reynolds and David Lewis, Teams Solve Problems Faster When They’re More 
Cognitively Diverse, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/teams-
solve-problems-faster-when-theyre-more-cognitively-diverse.	
98 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2933292.	
99 Maria Aluchna & Tomasz Kuszewski, Does Corporate Governance Increase Company 
Value? Evidence from the Best Practice of the Board, J. OF RISK AND FIN. MGMT. (Oct. 
2020) at 4 (showing a negative correlation between compliance with the code provisions 
on board practice and company value, suggesting that investors do not find the adoption of 





performance is rewarded and poor performance addressed,100 and ensures that 
operations align with the company’s mission.  Governance is perhaps most 
commonly associated with divisions of power between corporate managers and 
owners.  But it is not, however, only a structural feature of corporate 
operations.  It also includes the safeguards embedded in a firm’s approach to 
addressing all the complex issues that arise when human beings collaborate 
and when there is the potential for some to gain at the expense of the larger 
enterprise, a subject some would refer to as managing human capital.101  For 
example, corporate boards are largely required to have a minimum number of 
independent directors alongside inside directors.  The idea is that independent 
directors are more likely to be impartial and vigilant in monitoring C-Suite 
actions than corporate insiders with dual roles as executives and directors.102  
Not only are they able to bring their own expertise to bear, the logic goes that 
they will be less directly beholden to the CEO in terms of their careers and 
livelihoods 
Similarly, cognitive diversity—and for that matter, Diversity, too—is 
often understood as a human-capital based governance mechanism premised 
on the usefulness of ”outsider” perspectives and interests.  Most commonly, it 
is associated with reducing the social pathology of groupthink.103  Groupthink 
is a phenomenon that arises when the urge to conform or the belief that dissent 
is itself harmful or unproductive leads a group of well-intentioned people to 
make irrational or non-optimal decisions.104  In such circumstances, premature 
consensus and decisionmaking can arise as individuals self-censor their true 
opinions or ideas, and therefore the group accumulates few or no dissenting 
views.105   
	
board practice a plausible solution for the principal–principal conflict in an environment of 
concentrated ownership). 
100 Id. at 2.  
101 Our own preference is to refer to human beings who labor for corporations as 
workers or employees, but we understand the business reason for the term. 
102 G. Sanchez-Marin, J.S. Baixauli-Soler, and M.E. Lucas-Perez,  When much is not 
better? Top management compensa-tion, board structure and performance in Spanish 
firms, 21 INT. J. OF HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 2778, 2792 (Dec. 4, 2010) (finding that, 
generally, when the percentage of outsider directors is higher, the earnings of top managers 
are lower, which indicate that it is positive to allow the board greater independence through 
the inclusion of outsiders to limit the discretionary power of the top management team and 
to moderate its earnings). 
103 Irving Janis first defined “groupthink” in 1972 as “a psychological drive for consensus 
at any cost that suppresses dissent and appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decisionmaking 
groups which in turn may lead to “incredibly gross miscalculation about both the practical 
and moral consequences of their decisions.”  Irving L. Janis, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (1972). 
104 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, GROUPTHINK, 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/groupthink.  
105 Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: 
Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 THE ACAD. 
OF MGMT. REV. 489, 496 (1999) (developing a model that links board demography with 
firm performance); see also Letter from public fund fiduciaries to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 31, 2015), Petition for Amendment of Proxy Rule, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2015/petn4-682.pdf (letter from several state 
investment and pension plans to the Securities and Exchange Commission stating that 





Groupthink is often explored in the context of corporate boards, where 
members may feel pressure to agree with one another or the CEO.106  In its 
classic iteration, members may not offer perspectives necessary for the board 
to achieve the corporation’s strategic interests, or maximize shareholder 
value.107  Instead, they typically submit themselves under the influence of an 
autocratic CEO/Chairman, or find themselves influenced by peer-pressure 
inside the group.108  As a result, board members either succumb to apathy, and 
simply go through the motions, or hubris can come to define their collective 
decisionmaking such that members believe every decision they make as a 
group will indubitably foster positive results.”109  
Against this backdrop, researchers have identified cognitive diversity, 
under the proper circumstances, as a prophylactic for groupthink pathologies.  
In culturally homogenous spaces, Diversity can help introduce competing 
interests, ideas, values, and perspectives into a more creative and higher quality 
decisionmaking process.  When faced with complex strategic issues 
necessitating out-of-the-box thinking, cognitively diverse groups will be able 
to leverage a broader range of information and possible solutions for 
consideration than homogeneous groups.110  And where a board captured by 
groupthink may cut off early dialogue and questioning, a Diverse board, 
comprised of different personal, professional and social backgrounds, might 
instead test hypotheses and policies brought up by managers and subject all 
ideas generated in the group to more rigorous review.111  This in turn can lead 
	
diverse boards are beneficial because they “raise different ideas and encourage a full airing 
of dissenting views”). 
106 But, as discussed below, psychologists examine groupthink in much more varied 
situations, and the issue is widely understood even in a corporate context to be one that can 
undermine decisionmaking from high-level executives to front line workers. See, e.g., 
Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1233 (2003) (analyzing directors’ role in the Enron scandal to illustrate how intelligent 
individuals can succumb to cognitive biases prevailing in corporate cultures); Melanie B. 
Leslie, Helping Nonprofits Police Themselves: What Trust Law Can Teach Us About 
Conflicts of Interest, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 551, 564 (2010) (discussing the unique dangers 
of groupthink in nonprofits); Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: 
Analyzing the Institutional Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social 
Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 55 (2010) (analyzing the 
institutional culture of family courts through the lens of groupthink). 
107 Antoine Canet, Groupthink in the Boardroom—The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 
SOCIAL SCI. RES. NETWORK 3 (June 10, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2839855 (examining the 
phenomenon of groupthink in a corporate setting). 
108 Id.  
109 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, supra note 104. 
110 Jackson, supra note 96 at 361. 
111 This observation has been made in the greater finance literature as well, where stock 
picking is viewed as at times highly complex art involving complex considerations. In one 
highly cited series of experiments conducted in Texas and Singapore, scientists put 
financially literate people in simulated markets and asked them to price stocks.  The 
participants were placed in either ethnically diverse or homogenous teams. The researchers 
found that individuals who were part of the diverse teams were 58% more likely to price 
stocks correctly.  Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic diversity deflates price bubbles, PNAS 
(2014), https://www.pnas.org/content/111/52/18524.abstract.  





to vastly different interpretations of data points, along with more nuanced 
debate and consideration of alternative strategies and courses of action.112  
Researchers consequently find that Diversity can lead to more communication 
on boards,113 and even more accountability of management.114  Similarly, 
within the organization, diverse opinions and perspectives can power reflection 
and critical thinking on the front lines of executing corporate policy. 
 Empirical evidence has also emerged that Diversity can serve as a 
useful risk mitigation tool.115  Studies have argued that Diverse firms, 
especially those displaying gender Diversity on their boards, adopt less risky 
financial policies116 than their homogeneous counterparts.  Researchers have 
also compiled data suggesting that Diversity is correlated with a lower 
likelihood of illegal and fraudulent behavior, and fewer irregularities and less 
opacity and vagueness in public filings and disclosure.117  Here again, diversity 
	
112 “Heterogeneous groups often invest more time resolving issues that require creativity 
and consensus building, because of their members’ diverse vocabularies, paradigms and 
possible objectives.”  Lynne Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate 
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1391 (2002).  See also Donald C. Hambrick, 
Theresa Seung Cho, and Ming-Jer Chen, The Influence of Top Management Team 
Heterogeneity on Firms’ Competitive Moves, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 659, 660–82 (1996). 
Variations of this theme have been echoed in the psychology literature suggesting that such 
productive cognitive rigor can arise in settings well beyond the boardroom.  For example, 
in a study published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, scientists 
assigned 200 people to six-person mock jury panels whose members were either all white 
or included four white and two black participants.  The people were shown a video of a 
trial of a black defendant and white victims.  They then had to decide whether the defendant 
was guilty.  […D]iverse panels raised more facts related to the case than homogenous 
panels and made fewer factual errors while discussing available evidence. If errors did 
occur, they were more likely to be corrected during deliberation.  One possible reason for 
this difference was that white jurors on diverse panels recalled evidence more accurately.  
Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, APA (2006), 
https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/psp-904597.pdf.  
113 Dallas, supra note 112 (suggesting that “heterogeneous groups share conflicting 
opinions, knowledge, and perspectives that result in a more thorough consideration of 
policy”).  
114 Studies have, for example, found that the presence of gender diversity can lead to a more 
intense focus on whether management is improving the company’s profitability and stock 
price.  See, e.g., M. E. Lucas-Perez, Women on the Board and Managers’ Pay: Evidence 
from Spain, 129 J. BUS. ETHICS 285 (2014) (noting that gender diversity on boards is 
associated with connecting executive pay to company performance); see also Renee B. 
Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and 
performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 292 (2009) (finding that “more diverse boards are more 
likely to hold CEOs accountable for poor stock price performance”).  
115 Gennaro Bernile, Vineet Bhagwat, & Scott Yonker, Board Diversity, Firm Risk, and 
Corporate Policies, 127 J. OF FIN. ECON. 588 (2018) (stating that homogeneity of 
preferences and views among board members could lead to idiosyncratic decisions, free of 
scrutiny within the board. Results of the study indicate that both operating performance 
and asset valuation increase with board diversity, and the benefits of diverse perspectives 
among directors outweigh the potential costs). 
116 Id. 
117 A study conducted by Cumming, Leung, and Rui in 2015 found that the presence of 
women on boards was correlated with lower likelihood of securities fraud, and lower 
severity of securities fraud, in Chinese capital markets. Douglas Cumming, Tak Yan Leung 





may play a role though alternative explanations range from the possibility that 
that firms that have the resources to invest in gender Diversity may also have 
the resources (and inclination) to invest in compliance118 to intuitions that as 
members of underrepresented groups women are more likely to have arm’s-
length relationships with CEOs and management, prompting more rigorous 
scrutiny of financial reports and policy.119   
Perhaps a more direct role for cognitive diversity is in the areas of in 
employment, where a commitment to good DEI practices can also help reduce 
the likelihood of risks that can arise in the context of employment 
discrimination.  In 2019 alone, the EEOC reported 23,976 lawsuits on the basis 
of race, and 23,532 claims of gender-based discrimination.120  The average 
employment lawsuit costs a company $200,000: of which  $80,000 goes to the 
employer’s attorneys’ fees, $80,000 for the employee’s attorneys’ fees, and 
$40,000 in settlement to the employee.121  Moreover, employment 
discrimination can attract the kind of publicity and community activism that 
may negatively affect firm value wealth through negative reputational 
feedback loops, a lesson learned by commercial giants like  Texaco and Coca-
Cola.122 
	
& Oliver M. Rui, Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud, ACAD. OF MGMT. J. (Feb. 2, 
2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2562399. In another study, 
gender Diversity was correlated with more transparency in terms of public disclosure. 
Ferdinand A. Gul, Bin Srinidhi, & Anthony C. Ng, Does board gender diversity improve 
the informativeness of stock prices?, 51 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 314, 314 (2011).  Along 
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financial reporting mistakes and have fewer “irregularity-type [financial] restatements, 
which tend to be indicative of financial manipulation.”  Aida S. Wahid, The Effects and the 
Mechanisms of Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from Financial Manipulation, J. BUS. 
ETHICS 23 (2017). 
118 Wahid, supra note 117 at 24. 
119 The management literature has found, for example, that gender-Diverse boards engage 
in better discussions because women are more willing to discuss issues that seem 
unpalatable to an all-male board.  Yu Chen, John D. Eshleman, and Jared S. Soileau, Board 
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Clarke, 2005; Huse & Solberg, 2006; Stephenson, 2004.  Diverse boards may as a result 
exhibit fewer information asymmetries, and as such provide fewer routes for company 
insiders to engage in opportunistic behavior prior to public disclosure of material 
information. See Self-Regulatory Organizations;  The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice 
of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, 85 
Fed. Reg. 80,472 at 271 (Dec. 11, 2020). 
120 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Press Release, EEOC Releases Fiscal Year 
2019 Enforcement and Litigation Data (2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-
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Employment discrimination may be less likely where there is a strong 
culture of inclusion and a highly diverse workforce.  Scholars have noted that 
initial reactions to allegations of racial discrimination can be defensive, 
precluding meaningful discussion of the harmful conduct or racial equity 
matters more generally.123  Diverse corporate staff with experience in 
addressing such frustrations can minimize this risk. And to the extent to which 
DEI policies are written, reviewed and implemented by individuals with 
diverse personal backgrounds, and expertise in Diversity, they are more likely 
to be effective from the standpoints of both firm culture and liability-reducing 
mechanisms. 
 A similar logic is easily applied to many other situations involving 
racially insensitive and illegal behavior.  By way of example, some major 
companies have faced both criticism and lawsuits for unlawful environmental 
practices because they have located operations that generate the most 
hazardous pollutants to human health in Black neighborhoods and other 
communities with poorer populations.124  Likewise, major financial institutions 
have been criticized for selective lending and banking practices that 
disadvantage Black consumers, practices that can also expose them to liability 
under federal and state statutes such as the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”).125  Even industries that the public 
	
123 Wade, supra note 123 at 395.  See also Lerner & Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
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Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 969 (2017) (noting how assignments 
of blame lead often to intense denial and defensive bolstering, making them seem unfair 
by the individual receiving the criticism).  	
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Unilever, whose actions allegedly disproportionately harmed the health and safety of 
minority and lower-income communities. Attorney General, DEP File 12 New 
“Environmental Justice” Lawsuits Targeting Polluters in New Jersey’s Lower-Income and 
Minority Communities, Department of Law & Public Safety Office of the Attorney General 
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases20/pr20200827b.html.  In San 
Francisco, three environmental groups filed a lawsuit against Corteva, formerly owned by 
Dow Chemical, alleging that the company’s plant violated hazardous waste laws, 
contributing to the high levels of asthma and cardiovascular disease of the residents in the 
mostly Black and Latino communities near the plant.  Groups File Federal Lawsuit Against 
Chemical Plan for Violating Hazardous Waste Laws, Environmental Integrity Project 
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://environmentalintegrity.org/news/groups-file-federal-lawsuit-
against-chemical-plant-for-violating-hazardous-waste-laws/.  Residents near a Marathon 
refinery in Detroit sued Marathon Oil Corporation and Marathon Petroleum Corporation, 
alleging air, noise, and odor pollution from the refinery.  Virginia Gordan, Residents Sue 
Marathon Refinery Over Pollution, MICHIGAN RADIO (Feb. 23, 2016), 
https://www.michiganradio.org/post/residents-sue-marathon-refinery-over-pollution.  The 
community residing in the area next to the refinery, which is one of the most polluted areas 
in the country, is a low-income, minority community.  Id.	
125 See infra notes [155-60] and accompanying text.  Bank of America agreed to pay $335 
million to settle allegations brought by the Department of Justice that Bank of America’s 
Countrywide subsidiary charged higher fees and interest rates to more than 200,000 Black 
and Hispanic borrowers than white borrowers. Justice Department Reaches $335 Million 
Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial 
Corporation, Department of Justice, (Dec. 21, 2011), 





largely approves of—like grocery chains—have faced adverse publicity for 
failing to serve urban communities of color and rural communities in poverty, 
and thus depriving those communities of access to healthy, quality food 
choices.126  The retail industry has also drawn fire for racial discrimination and 
profiling practices against customers.127  
In each of these cases, it is rational to assume that the presence of 
racially or ethnically diverse corporate staff, coupled with equitable policies 
and an inclusive culture, might in many instances result in  different outcomes.  
Personal experiences affect what facts individuals see and problems they 
recognize.  Individuals coming from racially and geographically diverse 
communities can share perspectives that might not be apparent for others.  If 
they lived in, or had friends or family who lived in urban or rural food deserts, 
they could communicate the human costs, as well as potential economic upside 
of serving affected communities.  Individuals with personal experiences with 
environmental racism, or racism more generally, might be more quick to raise 
objections to locating factories and pollutants in Black and Brown 
	
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-335-million-settlement-
resolve-allegations-lending-discrimination. Recently, Wells Fargo agreed to pay 
Philadelphia $10 million to settle a lawsuit from 2017 that the city brought against the 
bank, alleging that the bank violated the FHA by offering more expensive and riskier 
mortgages to Black and Latino borrowers than to white borrowers, which led to 
foreclosures and reduced city property taxes. Caitlin McCabe, Wells Fargo to pay Philly 
$10 million to resolve lawsuit alleging lending discrimination against minorities (Dec. 16, 
2019), https://www.inquirer.com/real-estate/housing/philadelphia-settles-lawsuit-wells-
fargo-allegations-discriminatory-mortgage-lending-minorities-20191216.html.  	
126 A study of the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the United States found that 17.7% of 
predominantly Black neighborhoods had limited access to supermarkets, while only 7.6% 
of predominantly white neighborhoods had limited access.  Critics have described this 
disparity as a result of “supermarket redlining” by grocery chains. Nathaniel Meyersohn, 
How the rise of supermarkets left out black America, CNN Business (June 16, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/16/business/grocery-stores-access-race-
inequality/index.html.  Kroger faced a boycott upon closing its stores in certain 
predominantly Black communities, following which these communities were at risk of 
becoming food deserts.  Alexander Coolidge and Sharon Coolidge, Jesse Jackson calls to 
expand Kroger boycott over its shuttering of stores in minority neighborhoods, USA 
TODAY (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/nation-
now/2018/04/10/jesse-jackson-kroger-protest/502688002/.  	
127 Aimee Green, ‘Shopping While Black’ lawsuits accuse Portland area retailers of 
discrimination (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2018/06/shopping_while_black_lawsuits.html (a 
Black man filed a racial discrimination lawsuit against Walmart, alleging that the store 
clerk accused him of stealing); Neil Vigdor and Elisha Brown, Walmart Says It Will No 
Longer Lock Up African-American Beauty Products, N. Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/business/walmart-black-hair-beauty-products.html 
(Walmart was also hit with a federal discrimination lawsuit for locking up beauty care 
products for Black women in black cases, following which the company stated that it will 
end this practice); Nadra Nittle, Moschino has been accused of using the code word 
“Serena” to refer to black shoppers, VOX (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-
goods/2019/1/16/18185696/moschino-code-word-serena-black-shoppers-racism (a former 
employee filed a racial discrimination lawsuit against Moschino, alleging that the staff used 
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communities, or recognize the likely reputational fallout and risks to 
shareholder value where their institutions employed lending or front-office 
practices that unfairly disadvantaged or mistreated minority communities. 
 But gender and racial diversity are not always sufficient to achieve 
superior outcomes in all situations.  If minorities and women share the same 
age, socioeconomic, educational, and geographic backgrounds as other 
colleagues in their group, the group may not necessarily be cognitively diverse 
enough to achieve superior solutions for certain problems.128  It is for that 
reason we embrace Diversity in its fullest sense of drawing on the full range of 
talents in society, including white people from working and middle-class 
backgrounds, and Americans from urban, suburban, and rural communities.  
Put simply, many  kinds of diversity might be important, from socioeconomic 
status to professional training and education.  Moreover, diversity can only be 
operationalized as an organizational feature if it is accompanied by an equitable 
and inclusive culture.  Only where people feel like their views are respected 
and welcome will they be willing to speak.  In the absence of leadership and 
corporate structures to support the free exchange of ideas, members of 
underrepresented groups can be easily marginalized, especially when their 
presence in a large group is modest.  In such circumstances, their very presence 
can be reduced to tokenism, and stereotyping could result in barriers to exert 
influence on decisions in the group as well as self-doubt.129  In the absence of 
an inclusive culture, a corporation may have Diverse cognitive capital at its 
disposal, but it will not be able to deploy it in ways that maximize the 
corporation’s success.130	
	
C. Corporate Reputation 
 
The empirical literature highlighting Diversity and shareholder value 
is at times useful, but the evidence is mixed, and how cognitive diversity relates 
to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion can be context dependent.  Against this 
backdrop, it is plausible that a third business case for Diversity—that of 
reputational enhancement in light of an increasingly diverse world—is the 
most uncontroverted and compelling for corporate directors and managers. 
According to this view, many investors, customers and employees value 
Diversity greatly, so much so that it informs their behaviors.  Corporations 
should thus attempt to secure strong reputations in Diversity in order to help 
lower their cost of capital, secure top talent, and grow revenue.131   
Considerations of shareholder value often begin with a corporation’s 
reputation, and for good reason.  An important body of research indicates that 
“reputation was, is, and always will be of immense importance to 
	
128 Adams & Ferreira, supra note 114 at 292.	
129 Rosabeth M. Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (1977).  
130 See John G. Oetzel, Self-Construals, Communication Processes, and Group Outcomes 
in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups, 32(1) SMALL GROUP RES. 19, 42, 44 (2001). 
131 Damion Waymer & Sarah VanSlette, Corporate Reputation Management and Issues of 
Diversity in THE HANDBOOK OF COMM. & CORP. REPUTATION 471, 473 (Craig E. Carroll 
ed., 2013) (noting that the benefits of a favorable reputation include the ability for 
corporations “to charge premium prices, attract better applicants, enhance their access to 
capital markets, and attract investors”).	





organizations, whether commercial, governmental, or not for profit.”132  
Reputations are the means by which stakeholders interpret corporate brands–
and the concomitant attractiveness of a company’s goods and services to its 
customers and clients.133  They inform how individuals investigate investment 
opportunities.134  And they affect  how many prospective employees judge 
employers,135 where customers want to spend dollars, and the willingness of 
other business to form important alliances.  In short, strong reputations can 
enable corporations to premium prices, attract better job applicants, enhance 
their access to capital markets, and attract investors.  Reputations thus have 
important implications for the profitability of corporations.136 
Diversity, or the lack thereof, comprises one element of a company’s 
reputation.137  The reasons why companies may seek a reputation as being 
Diverse, Equitable, and Inclusive are varied, but many researchers often focus 
on the signaling function it may provide, especially to prospective employees.  
Having a diverse board or management may convey otherwise unobservable 
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by companies embroiled in diversity scandals is significant by conducting case studies of 
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information to the public, like how receptive the company is to a diverse 
workforce, or how open and inclusive the company’s culture may be.138   
These kinds of signals are important for securing top talent.  Industry 
surveys consistently show that workplace Diversity ranks high on job seekers’ 
list of priorities when looking for a job, with nearly half of all Americans 
indicating that diverse workplaces are important to them.  The pull of diversity 
is, however, strongest among Millennials and Generation Xers, who together 
account for over two-thirds of today’s labor force.139  In one recent survey by 
ZipRecruiter, 86% of respondents identified workplace diversity as a top 
consideration, placing it among the top three job search criteria, along with 
salary and schedule flexibility.140  Millennials are even likely to stay nearly 
twice as long as their average 2.8-year tenure at a company that fosters 
Diversity, Equity and Inclusion.141  To some extent, this reflects the greater 
Diversity of younger-aged people in the United States, though not entirely.  
Although women tend to favor workplace Diversity more than men, and Black, 
Latino and Asian employees more than whites, clear majorities of men and 
whites have been found in studies to consider Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion 
to be important workplace considerations.142 
Reputations for strong Diversity can also be helpful in securing and 
keeping customers and clients.  At least part of many consumers’ purchasing 
decision comes from one’s perception as to whether the product or services 
	
138 For a general overview of signaling theory, see Brian L. Connelly et al., Signaling 
Theory: A Review and Assessment, J. OF MANAGEMENT (2011), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254121372_Signaling_Theory_A_Review_and
_Assessment.  But see Lisa Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board 
Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 UNIV. OF CIN. L. REV. 431, 448 (2008) (concluding 
that the signaling rationale for board diversity is at its strongest under particular conditions 
that may not exist in all corporations at all times).   
139 Manpower Group, Millennial Careers: 2020 Vision, 3 (2016), 
https://www.manpowergroup.com/wps/wcm/connect/660ebf65-144c-489e-975c-
9f838294c237/MillennialsPaper1_2020Vision_lo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (studying 19,000 
working Millennials and 1,500 hiring managers across 25 countries between February and 
April 2016). 
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Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG 
Activism and the New Millennial, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 139, 151–52 (forthcoming 2020) 
(arguing that Millennials also want to work for companies whose values they share and are 
acting as employees to call for their companies to improve their commitment to social 
responsibility). 
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provider aligns with their values.143  This has become more  important in 
today’s world of social activism, and with the younger consumers who are 
more likely to be “values-driven, not value-driven.”144  In a recent survey by 
Deloitte, for example, both Millennials and Gen Z, nearly one third of 
millennial customers stated they have deepened or initiated relationships with 
retailers who balance doing “good” and making a profit.145    
Conversely, bad reputations can be damaging to the firm and 
shareholder value.  Often this is reflected in lawsuits, a point long emphasized 
in the anti-discrimination literature.  Litigation arising from contravening the 
values of Diversity can lead to the disrepute of the corporation that undermines 
its ability to increase its sustainable profitability. Verdicts of culpability and 
liability shape public perceptions of a firm’s commitment to equality.  The 
publicity that flows from the very process of regulatory investigations and 
litigation produces information on the behavior of the corporation—and parties 
to the dispute.146  This information reaches third parties and affects the way 
that outsiders view the corporation and relevant actors regardless and beyond 
the effects of direct legal outcomes.  In other words, this information  helps 
shape the market reaction to alleged misbehavior, even if the outcome is 
eventually favorable to the company.147  Savvy jobseekers research the 
company before applying, and workplaces facing several discrimination 
lawsuits often observe a chilling effect on recruiting as top candidates to look 
to less controversial or accommodating employers.148  Investors may decide 
not to purchase shares of the company out of principle.  Prospective customers 
may decide to take their business elsewhere.  Other corporations may steer 
clear of joint ventures. 
Bad reputations do not, of course, only result from regulatory actions 
and litigation. Deloitte’s surveys also made clear that young consumers will 
not “hesitate to penalize companies whose stated and practiced values conflict 
with their own.”149  And this is far from an empty threat in today’s age of social 
	
143 Olivia Valentine, The Growing Importance of Brand Responses to Equality and 
Diversity, WE ARE SOCIAL (July 30, 2020), https://wearesocial.com/blog/2020/07/the-
growing-importance-of-brand-responses-to-equality-and-diversity (showing that at least 
part of consumers’ purchasing decision comes from consideration of whether a brand 
aligns with their values).   
144 Barzuza, supra note 140 (arguing that a three-dimensional millennial effect—as 
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provide a counterweight to the wealth-maximization paradigm of corporate governance, 
and specifically arguing that institutional investors recognize that attention to issues like 
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media, where anyone can congregate and organize against firms, sometimes to 
devastating effect.  Perhaps one of the most obvious instances of the harm that 
can possibly arise was observed in 2018 when Papa John’s founder used a 
racial epithet on a conference call and criticized Colin Kaepernick and other 
athletes for protesting police brutality; the pizza chain’s sales began to 
decline.150  Competitor chains, such as DiGiorno and Pizza Hut, engaged in 
“Twitter wars” attacking Papa John’s, and a white supremacist website 
crowned Papa John’s as the “official pizza of the alt-right,” bringing even more 
negative attention to the worsening reputation of Papa John’s.151 Sales dropped 
7.1% for the year, and first quarter income dropped from $22.8 million, to $4.6 
million.152  It was not the first time even that year that reputational 
consequences would come to cost a major company:  Just three months prior, 
Starbucks had to delay a marketing push after two African Americans were 
arrested in Philadelphia after wishing to use the restroom, an event watched 
over eight million times on Twitter.  The ensuing criticism prompted the 
company to close its stores and conduct sensitivity training across many of its 
locations, hurting same-store sales and driving profits down over nine 
percent.153 
Domestic demographic changes have worked with globalization and 
the free flow of information to increase reputational and business stakes.  The 
U.S. population, the country’s domestic consumer pool and workforce, is 
expected to become ever more racially and ethnically diverse, without a single 
racial majority or ethnic majority by 2055154—with Millennials and Gen Zers 
comprising the most diverse generational cohort in U.S. history.155 
Furthermore, the North American workforce is expected to fall from 5% to 4% 
of the global workforce in the next two decades while the population in sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America are set to explode.156  Experts consequently 
connect the pursuit of Diversity with not only cultivating new domestic 
consumers, workers, and investors, but also with engaging new foreign 
stakeholders with varied cultural values, experiences and interests. 
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There is also a growing recognition that collective action by the 
business sector to include more Americans in our economy’s benefits can fuel 
overall growth for the economy, and drive demand in a way that will increase 
corporate profits.  Citi’s report finds that if racial gaps had been closed 20 years 
ago, the U.S. economy could have benefited from as much as $16 trillion of 
additional GDP.157  Based on this calculation, the report estimates that the 
closing of the gaps could add roughly $5 trillion to U.S. GDP through 2025.158  
From a global perspective, Accenture similarly estimates that if the perception 
gap.  Accenture similarly estimates that if the perception gap of gender equality 
between employers and employees were narrowed by 50%, global profits 
would increase by 33%, including an increase of $1.05 trillion by the U.S.159 
The businesses in the vanguard of driving this positive change are the ones 
most likely to improve their reputations and secure a larger share of the 
resulting gains.  The acknowledgement of Diversity as a reputational asset is 
abundant.  Magazines, from DiversityInc to Working Mother, release surveys 
sent to leading corporations from which they derive annual rankings on issues 
including recruitment and retention, specific ethnic groups, and LGBTQ+ 
communities, work-life balance, and more.160  And major companies submit 
materials needed to be evaluated by these independent raters, and boast on their 
websites and in promotional materials when they score well.161 
The importance of independent raters, and high Diversity reputations, 
has grown  as institutional investors increasingly focus on social issues like 
DEI.  As society has become more socially conscious,  new investment funds 
have emerged, epitomized by the EESG movement, which attempt to identify 
corporations that, while profitable, embrace positive social values like 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion—and adjacent areas such as fair worker 
treatment, environmental responsibility and sound governance.  Spurred by 
high-net-worth clients and pension funds, fund managers have created 
offerings designed to allocate assets to investment funds that make a 
difference, usually with Diversity as one of the metrics for assigning scores of 
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portfolio companies.162  And in the future, the weighting of Diversity is likely 
to only increase.163 
Part of the impetus behind the EESG sector’s growth has been 
financial: the returns thus far have been positive, with EESG funds largely 
outperforming the market.164  But this growth also reflects an awareness that 
because investor preferences are themselves diverse, moral-driven choices can 
drive market activity and shareholder returns. Things once considered 
immaterial, like new information being introduced into the market concerning 
a company’s Diversity performance, can push a company’s stock price 
higher.165   
	
162 George Sarafeim, Investors as Stewards of the Commons?, 30 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
1, 11 (2017) (noting that when investors’ pressures are not satisfied through private 
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2015, 34% of all shareholder proposals were EESG related, led by socially responsible 
investment funds and public pension funds, followed by activist hedge funds and index 
funds); Jenna Weinberg & Simon Greer, Diverse Asset Managers Initiative, Fiduciary 
Guide to Investing with Diverse Asset Managers and Firms, SEC (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/amac-background-dami-fiduciary-guide.pdf; but see Max M. 
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: 
The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 386 (2020) 
(arguing that a trustee can engage in ESG investing only if “(1) the trustee reasonably 
concludes that the ESG investment program will benefit the beneficiary directly by 
improving risk-adjusted return; and (2) the trustee’s exclusive motive for adopting the ESG 
investment program is to obtain this direct benefit”). 
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equity-index-performance-in-the-us (noting that although the magnitude of the 
outperformance varies among the different ESG index providers, it’s important to note that 
each has beaten the benchmark over time and has done so consistently, regardless of ESG 
methodology or ESG data provider).	
165 One Stanford study canvassed shareholder reactions to nearly 60 gender Diversity 
announcements that publicly traded firms in the technology and finance sectors made 
between 2014 and 2018.  The study measured each firm’s stock returns on the day of the 
diversity announcement, controlling for total U.S. market returns. In both sectors, stock 
prices increased more when announcements revealed a higher level of Diversity. Among 
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With demand for socially conscious offerings growing, EESG ratings 
have proliferated, and corporations face growing pressure to achieve and then 
maintain strong rankings or “scores.”166  If a company’s stock is designated an 
“unsustainable asset” due to its failure to adopt measures consonant with EESG 
credentials or priorities like Diversity, corporate officers and directors face the 
prospect of their company’s stock being excluded from investment 
portfolios.167  And for many companies, the consequences could be material.  
If a sufficient number of investors are then excluded from accessing the fund, 
or if a sufficient number of funds act in concert based on a score, or series of 
scores, the price of a company’s stock can fall as demand falls—or other 
investors could even short the company’s stock, putting downward pressure on 
its share price.168   
 
*     *     * 
 
For all the reasons we have addressed, we therefore believe that a 
plausible, indeed sound, business rationale exists that businesses that cultivate 
collaboration by diverse minds, that value merits-based factors instead of social 
origins, and that welcome working with customers, communities, and partners 
from all segments of society and the globe will be better positioned to thrive in 
what is itself an increasingly diverse world economy. 
 
 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT REFORMS TO ENCOURAGE CORPORATE 
DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION 
	
 The private sector’s growing awareness of the business advantages of 
Diversity, the ethical values of business leaders, and the anticipation of the 
demographic changes coming in the U.S., had already led some corporations  
to adopt voluntary  DEI policies.  But it has been above all the national 
reckoning with the death of George Floyd and the disparate effects of the 
COVID-19 pandemic that have led to concrete policy initiatives being 
announced across the country aimed at increasing Diversity, Equity, and 
Inclusion within corporate organizations.  Widespread moral outrage and a 
cultural awakening has catalyzed both  new government activism and corporate 
action, on the other, with energy being directed in improving the Diversity, 
Equity, and Inclusion of corporate America.  
	
166 Richa Joshi, Board Diversity: No Longer Optional, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Oct. 11, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/11/board-
diversity-no-longer-optional/ (discussing results of pressure to improve board diversity 
through recent laws and institutional investors).  
167 Robert Eccles and Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. B. REV.  
https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution (observing that as it becomes clear that the 
people who decide whether to buy or sell a company’s stock have internalized ESG into 
their calculations, business leaders will be forced to do the same within their companies).	
168 See Chris Sloley, How ethical is it to short the bad boys of ESG?, 
https://citywireselector.com/news/how-ethical-is-it-to-short-the-bad-boys-of-
esg/a1283784 (examining whether investors should actively short such stocks to further 
punish socially problematic players).	





In this Section, we survey the most high-profile efforts. We start, 
however, with an analysis of the limitations of legacy anti-discrimination laws 
geared towards advancing racial and economic equality.  We then catalogue a 
growing number of corporate Diversity initiatives:  California state reforms 
aiming for diversity, Nasdaq’s board diversity initiative and capital markets 
initiatives spearheaded by pension and investment funds.  As will be seen 
below, most reforms are aimed at either reforming perceived inadequacies in 
corporate law to reflect the potential value of Diversity or leveraging securities 
law to enable greater transparency of board-level Diversity.  We explain, 
however, that although these initiatives represent fresh and much needed 
thinking about the demographic dilemma facing corporations, they offer in 
practice limited and incomplete answers to the profound challenge of corporate 
inequality, and fail to address the full range of DEI issues involved in corporate 
conduct toward all their stakeholders. 
 
 A. Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws 
 
Calls for reform of corporate entities are not arising in a vacuum, and 
it is important to understand the preexisting legal backdrop against which they 
operate.  Critically, a range of federal laws require corporations to, as a matter 
of basic compliance, implement policies and practices that attend to DEI, 
which are supplemented by comparable  state laws.169  For example, the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), which amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, prohibits employers from sex-based wage discrimination between men 
and women who are in substantially equal positions.170  One year later, 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that further broadened the scope 
of federal anti-discrimination laws, and bans practices that have a disparate 
impact on protected groups, unless these practices can be justified by a 
legitimate business reason.  Title VII of the Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) in 
particular prohibits discrimination not only based on sex but also based on race, 
color, religion or national origin, and applies to any employer who has 15 or 
more employees.171  In addition, Title II of the Civil Right Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin that denies a 
person “the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation.”172  Public accommodation is defined broadly to include 
facilities such as hotels, restaurants and theaters.173 
	
169 Most states, and some cities, have their own anti-discrimination laws, which extend 
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991 then strengthened anti-discrimination 
laws in the wake of several controversial decisions,174 giving plaintiffs the right 
to trial by jury and compensatory and punitive damages for intentional 
discrimination under Title VII.  In addition to federal laws, employers must 
adhere to the anti-discrimination laws that have been adopted by most states.175   
In response to systemic racial segregation and in the wake of Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, the Congress passed the FHA in 1968 to 
prohibit discrimination in housing transactions based on race, color, religion 
and national origin, and, as amended, sex, disability and family status.176  The 
U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) enforce the FHA, and individuals may file lawsuits 
under the FHA as well.177  In addition to the FHA, Congress passed the ECOA 
in 1974. which, as amended, prohibits creditors from discriminating against 
applicants based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, family status and 
age.178  Despite the FHA and ECOA, housing discrimination against Black 
Americans continued as financial institutions used the deposits they accepted 
from inner cities to lend and invest in other neighborhoods.179 The practice of 
denying credit to an eligible applicant based on the neighborhood the applicant 
resided, referred to as “redlining,” led to the enactment of the Community 
Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) in 1977 to encourage financial institutions to meet 
the credit needs of the communities in which they are located.180 
 Notably, the damages from violating these rules can be substantial.  
Most employment discrimination cases under Title VII, for example, can be 
brought under traditional class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Procedure 
Act, along with violations of ECOA.181  Meanwhile, violations of the Equal 
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Pay Act (“EPA”) are brought as collective actions, which though requiring that 
all plaintiffs consent, can be larger monetarily, as can administrative actions 
taken by agencies like the EEOC to punish actors for systemic 
discrimination.182 
For the purposes of corporate diversity, however, the reach of federal 
civil rights laws is subject to considerable constraints, especially as it pertains 
to corporate boards.  Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal to 
discriminate in employment practices, it does not apply to corporate board 
membership because board members, with the exception of the corporate 
insiders who serve,183 are usually not employees.184  In fact, courts routinely 
hold that the statute does not apply to corporate directors.  As the Seventh 
Circuit has put it: “Directors are traditionally employer rather than employee 
positions.”185 
 The upshot is that nondiscrimination laws apply to firms, and to hiring 
and promotion, but as one moves toward top-level corporate governance, 
where in some instances board Diversity may be most important, it ceases to 
have as much applicability.  It does, however, apply to the C-Suite, though as 
discussed above, other issues including social networking and internal 
advancement obstacles have been found to stymie women and ethnic 
minorities as a group in terms of both getting hired by, and climbing, corporate 
hierarchies. 
In response to these gaps, Congress has weighed in on the importance 
of improving board transparency.  In 2017, Representative Carolyn Maloney 
introduced the “Gender Diversity in Corporate Leadership Act of 2017,” which 
would require public companies to provide proxy disclosure regarding the 
gender Diversity of the board of directors and nominees.186  In November 2019, 
the U.S. House of Representatives, with bipartisan support, passed the 
“Corporate Governance Through Diversity Act of 2019,” which requires 
certain registrants annually to disclose the racial, ethnic, and gender 
composition of their boards and executive officers, as well as the veteran status 
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of any of those directors and officers, in their proxy statements.187  The bill also 
requires the disclosure of any policy, plan or strategy to promote racial, ethnic, 
and gender Diversity among these groups.  Legislators have proposed a 
companion bill in the U.S. Senate.188 
 
 B. SEC Board Diversity Disclosure Rules 
 
In 2009, the SEC adopted a rule designed to assess individual 
companies’ commitment to establishing and maintaining Diversity on their 
board.189  Under the rule, public companies are required to disclose whether 
diversity is a factor in considering candidates for nomination to the board of 
directors, and how the company assesses how effective the policy has been.190  
But, as Laurence Trautman has explained, companies and the SEC diverged in 
terms of their interpretations of the rule, with the majority of companies 
differentiating “consideration” of Diversity and Diversity “policy.”191   
A decade later, the Commission revisited the rules by establishing new 
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (“C&DI”).192  The revisions did 
not, however, provide a definition of Diversity, leaving issuers free to refrain 
from disclosing the race, ethnicity or gender of their directors or nominees.193  
Instead of identifying what criteria constitute Diversity, a non-exhaustive list 
of examples of Diverse characteristics was provided, including “race, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, nationality, disability, sexual orientation, or cultural 
background.”194  Meanwhile, the issuer’s description of a company’s Diversity 
policy would be relied on as an explanatory tool providing “a discussion of 
how the company considers the self-identified diversity attributes of nominees 
as well as any other qualifications its diversity policy takes into account, such 
as Diverse work experiences, military service, or socioeconomic or 
demographic characteristics.”195 
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Currently Item 401(e)(1) of Regulation S-K requires a company to 
“briefly discuss the specific experience, qualifications, attributes or skills that 
led to the conclusion that the person should serve as a director.”196  The C&DI 
clarifies that if a board considered a director’s self-identified Diversity 
characteristics (e.g., race, gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, disability, 
sexual orientation or cultural background) during the nomination process, and 
the individual consents to disclose those Diverse characteristics, the 
Commission “would expect that the company’s discussion required by Item 
401 would include, but not necessarily be limited to, identifying those 
characteristics and how they were considered.”197 
Along with requiring companies to indicate whether Diversity is 
considered when identifying director nominees (and if so, how) Item 
407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation S-K requires companies to indicate if the board or 
nominations committee has adopted a Diversity policy and describe how the 
policy is implemented and its effectiveness is assessed.198  The Commission’s 
logic was one that sought maximum flexibility for firms given  the fact that 
“companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting different 
perspectives.  For instance, some companies may conceptualize diversity 
expansively to include differences of viewpoint, professional experience, 
education, skill and other individual qualities and attributes that contribute to 
board heterogeneity, while others may focus on diversity concepts such as race, 
gender and national origin.”199  In the view of the Commission, and in light of 
such Diversity in Diversity, companies should be allowed to define Diversity 
in ways that they consider appropriate. 
Critics have, however, asserted that the flexibility provided under the 
rule has rendered it, if not meaningless, then gravely ineffective.  For one, the 
self-executing nature of the disclosures, combined with the substantive 
voluntariness of embracing Diversity policies, has meant that the data reported 
have been  unreliable and of minimal utility  to investors.  Not only have public 
companies failed to disclose much information about their boards, but also 
there has been little uniformity in either what is reported or the definitions of 
Diversity characteristics across companies.  Some policymakers have, as a 
consequence, urged reforms of Reg S-K to require data and reporting regarding 
gender and racial diversity on corporate boards.200	   
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 C. State Law Initiatives 
 
In addition to federal rules, states have turned their attention to laws 
that go beyond anti-discrimination.  The legislature in each of Michigan,201 
Pennsylvania, Hawaii, and Massachusetts are working on bills that, if passed, 
would nudge (and in some instances require) employers to increase Diversity 
in leadership positions, especially boards of public corporations.  Only two 
states, California and New York, have passed legislation imposing such duties.  
Below, we examine their key features. 
 
1. California’s Board Diversity Laws 
 
 California has passed two separate board diversity statutes, one aimed 
at gender diversity, the other at racial and ethnic diversity, as well as sexual 
orientation.  First, on September 30, 2018, former California Governor Jerry 
Brown approved Senate Bill 826 (“SB 826”). which mandated “female 
representation on California-based companies’ corporate board.”202  Two years 
later, California Governor Gavin Newsom approved Assembly Bill 979 (“AB 
979”), mandating a similar requirement whereby public companies 
headquartered in California must “diversify their boards of directors with 
directors from ‘underrepresented communities’.”203  Both SB 826 and AB 979 
apply to publicly held companies which are headquartered in the state of 
California, and both impose mandatory Diversity requirements beyond merely 
disclosing board composition.  
By the end of 2021, SB 826 requires every “publicly held domestic or 
foreign corporation whose principal executive offices . . . are located in 
California” to “adhere to a schedule whereby boards of six or more have three 
or more female directors; boards of five have two or more female directors, 
and boards of four or fewer have one or more female directors.”204  The 
legislation grants the California Secretary of State authority to enforce 
company violations of the law by either (1)  publishing a list of companies who 
are compliant or non-compliant or (2) imposing fines on boards who failed to 
disclose board composition.  In the case of monetary fines, the quantum to be 
assessed for an initial violation is $100,000; $300,000 is to be assessed for 
every subsequent violation.  
AB 979 is a parallel law with similar provisions, though with a broader 
scope. Specifically, AB 979 defines “director from underrepresented 
community” as “an individual who self-identifies as Black, African American, 
Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, 
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or Alaska Native, or who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or 
transgender.”205   
Its mandatory quotas state that “[publicly held corporations with HQ 
in California] must have at least one director from an underrepresented 
community on their boards by December 31, 2021.  By December 31, 2022, 
covered corporations with boards of nine or more directors must have a 
minimum of three directors from underrepresented communities on their 
boards, and covered corporations with boards of more than four but less than 
nine directors must have a minimum of two directors from underrepresented 
communities. AB 979’s two enforcement mechanisms are identical to those of 
SB 826. 
 
2. New York’s Board Diversity Study and Disclosure 
Mandate 
 
In December 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Senate 
Bill 4278 (“SB 4278”), which enacts the “Women on Corporate Boards 
Study.”206  Similar to the California bills, SB 4278 mandates that “domestic 
and foreign corporations ‘authorized to do business’ [in New York]” abide by 
board composition reporting mandates.  Under the law, both private and public 
corporations — regardless of whether they are headquartered in the state — 
must disclose the number of directors they appoint to their board and how many 
of those directors are female. The information will be collected as part of the 
corporation’s filing statement required by the Business Corporation Law.207  
New York’s Department of State and Taxation and Finance Departments are 
then charged with studying the number of women directors who serve on each 
board of directors of domestic corporations and foreign corporations licensed 
to do business in New York state.  
The initial results of the study will be published on February 1, 2022, 
likely leading to more concrete action. In its current state, the bill does not 
impose any quotas and does not mandate a specific number of women to be on 
the boards of corporations that do business in New York. 
 
 D.   Market “EESG” Initiatives 
  
Private market participants are also driving   the debate on corporate 
Diversity.  As shown, people have shown increasing interest in participating in 
markets—as either consumers or investors—in ways that conform with their 
values.208  This interest has in turn pushed varying market participants to adopt 
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practices and stances that reflect these changing, and intensifying, preferences, 
especially given the data-driven nature of investment products such as 
Diversity-specific indices and broader EESG funds.209 
 
1. Investment Company Initiatives 
 
Pension funds and investment companies have shown increasing 
interest in the topic of Diversity during this century, especially as to gender.210  
As early as 2009, the SEC sought comment on whether to amend Item 
407(c)(2)(vi) of Regulation S-K such as to require disclosure of whether a 
nominating committee considers Diversity when selecting a director for a 
position on the board.211  Of the more than 130 comment letters on its proposal, 
most were submitted in favor of the proposal, and by groups with a specific 
interest in Diversity, or by institutional investors, including mutual funds, 
pension funds, and socially responsible investment funds.212  Several years 
later in 2015, nine large public pension funds who collectively supervised 
$1.12 trillion in assets at the time petitioned the SEC to require registrants to 
disclose information related to, among other things, the gender, racial, and 
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ethnic Diversity of the registrant’s board nominees.213  In 2017, Human Capital 
Management Coalition, which described itself as a group of institutional 
investors with $2.8 trillion in assets at the time, made a similar petition to the 
Commission.214  
Nearly a half decade later, pressured by not only its members facing 
investor pressure and enhanced interest in EESG funds, but by also ratings 
companies seeking to design systems for categorizing firms, the investment 
company industry is once again calling for more information on diversity from 
companies. In October 2020, the Illinois Treasurer spearheaded an initiative 
along with 20 other investor organizations, calling on all companies in the 
Russell 3000 Index to disclose the composition of their board, including each 
board member’s gender, race and ethnicity.215  That same month, BlackRock 
Inc., the world’s largest asset manager, announced plans in 2021 to push 
companies for greater ethnic and gender Diversity for their boards and 
workforces, and disclosed that it will vote against directors who fail to act to 
promote that goal.  The money manager, which oversees more than $7.8 trillion 
of assets, is asking U.S. companies to disclose the racial, ethnic and gender 
makeup of their employees—data known as EEO-1—as well as measures 
they’re taking to advance diversity and inclusion.216  It will also make explicit 
pushes for Diversity in select jurisdictions.217  Meanwhile,  Vanguard has said 
it plans to vote against company directors who fail to push for greater racial 
and gender diversity on their boards.218  State Street Global Advisors, which 
manages about $3 trillion for clients, has committed to ask companies about 
their metrics and goals to boost racial Diversity within their ranks.   
Against this backdrop, the ICI, the trade association for American and 
international investment companies like mutual funds, closed-end funds, 
exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts, has likewise announced 
plans to push for greater Diversity.  Initial priorities include measuring industry 
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demographics “at both the board and workforce levels” through mandatory 
surveys of members.219  This information will then be used to develop 
benchmarks to improve Diversity in the future. Once these benchmarks are 
eventually implemented, it is expected that there will be more explicit reporting 
guidelines, and perhaps requirements, for board diversity similar to those 
proposed by other securities industry participants. 
 
2. NASDAQ Listing Requirements 
 
NASDAQ’s proposed rule (the “Rule”) would mandate certain board 
diversity requirements for public companies listed under its exchange.220  The 
Rule was submitted on December 1, 2020 for SEC approval. Under the 
proposed Rule, each NASDAQ-listed company would face two sets of 
requirements.  First, each listed company would have to	annually disclose in a 
uniform format, either in the company’s annual proxy statement or on the 
company’s website, statistical information regarding its directors’ self-
identified gender, race, and self-identification as LGBTQ+.  Additionally,  
companies listed on the Nasdaq Global Select tier or Global Market tier would 
have to have (or explain why they do not have) at least one Diverse director 
within two years of SEC approval, and at least two Diverse directors within 
four years of SEC approval.  Smaller-cap companies listed on the Nasdaq 
Capital Market tier would have to have (or explain why they do not have) at 
least one Diverse director within two years of SEC approval, and at least two 
Diverse directors within five years of SEC approval. 
NASDAQ’s proposed rule would presumably have a broad impact, 
encouraging thousands of companies listed on its stock exchange to include 
women, racial minorities and LGBTQ+ individuals on their boards, in what 
would be one of the most forceful moves yet to bring greater diversity to U.S. 
corporations.  Notably, more than three-quarters of its listed companies would, 
in the absence of changes to their board, fall short of the proposed 
requirements.221  Although 80% or 90% of companies had at least one female 
director, only approximately one-quarter had a second director who would 
meet the Diversity requirements.222  Overall, smaller companies tended to have 
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3. The Goldman Sachs IPO Pledge 
 
In February 2020, Goldman Sachs announced that it will only 
underwrite IPOs for U.S. and European private companies that have at least 
one Diverse board member.224  This rule became effective on July 1, 2020, and 
starting in 2021, Goldman Sachs will raise its target to “two diverse candidates 
for each of our IPO clients.”  As stated, the commitment relates to any private 
company looking to hire Goldman Sachs to underwrite its initial public 
offering.  The Diversity requirement is mandatory, but it is implied that there 
is discretion as to what qualifies as “Diverse.” The commitment statement cites 
Goldman Sachs’ own Board of Directors, where the Lead Director is a Nigerian 
man and four of the 11 board seats are held by women.	
 
E.  The Limitations of External Regulation and the  
 Corresponding Need for Corporate Action 
 
Collectively, current U.S. proposals designed to increase corporate 
Diversity do so in largely unprecedented ways, with particular emphasis falling 
most squarely on corporate boards.  They do so along two basic dimensions:  
either a) state law reforms, or b) reforms that leverage capital markets 
infrastructures and services providers. 
There are, however, a number of important limitations with the current 
trajectory of reforms.  First are possible constitutional challenges.225  
California’s SB 826 has already been challenged on equal-protection grounds 
in several lawsuits.226  In Meland v. Padilla, a conservative legal organization 
unsuccessfully claimed on behalf of a public company shareholder that, in 
requiring a female board member, the law prevented that shareholder from 
voting as he desired.227  In another case, Crest v. Padilla, the plaintiff sought 
to prevent the California Secretary of State, Alex Padilla, from spending 
taxpayer money to enforce the law on the ground that it violated the California 
constitution by imposing an unconstitutional gender-based quota. In June, a 
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state Superior Court judge overruled Padilla’s argument that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing.228  The matter is currently in ongoing litigation, and the 
Secretary of State’s office will be required to answer the complaint.  
AB 979 will likely be challenged on similar grounds.229  Opponents of 
the laws may argue that male candidates, or non-Diverse candidates, are denied 
fundamental rights under the equal protection clause as a result of mandatory 
diversity quotas.  Notably, these challenges will likely trigger strict scrutiny of 
these race- and gender-based laws and thus, though remedial in nature and 
designed to address a long-standing history of discrimination, the laws will, as 
we discuss below, face an uncertain future before the right-wing majority of 
the  U.S. Supreme Court, and that reality will create dilemmas for corporate 
decisionmaking.  To the extent to which the law imposed substantive board 
requirements on out-of-state corporations, the law could additionally be 
challenged on the basis of the internal affairs doctrine, which provides that the 
internal affairs (such as corporate governance) of a corporation should be 
governed by the state law in which it is incorporated.  
The NASDAQ reforms create far less uncertainty insofar as they, 
although expressing clear objectives, do not introduce mandatory reforms to 
Boards.  Instead, listed firms are required to comply or explain why they did 
not meet listing standards.  Theoretically, however, challenges could 
nonetheless arise if a qualified candidate seeking a position on a public 
company’s board argued that he was deprived of a property interest by being 
denied a board position primarily for not meeting “Diverse” criteria under the 
Rule.  Alternatively, the Rule might be challenged under the internal affairs 
doctrine. Under this logic, NASDAQ should not be able to impose federal 
guidelines about board composition when state corporate law should govern its 
makeup. 
Still, the most obvious limitation of NASDAQ’s new listing rules—
along with that of the ICI—is that they are ultimately not mandatory.  Instead, 
a company can choose whatever course of action it wants, unless other legal 
constraints arise in some other corner.   
Additionally, NASDAQ’s rules, along with the engagement of ICI and 
Goldman Sachs, apply exclusively to public companies.  None apply to private 
companies.  From a public policy perspective, and from the standpoint of racial 
equity, this limited scope is problematic.  There are only about half as many 
public companies in the United States today as there were in the late 1990s.230  
And promising start-ups are tending to stay private longer, with elite investors 
capturing even more of the biggest gains.231  By thus extending only to public 
companies, the capital markets-based reforms miss companies where the most 
value is created.  They also fail to affect firms at a point in time when the 
introduction of Diverse boards might likely prove most transformative.  
Diversity experts agree that the easiest means of ensuring that firms are diverse 
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is by making sure that they take steps toward diverse hiring early on.232  It is, 
in short, much easier to ensure Diversity by hiring Black and Brown people 
early on, than scaling, and then taking on Diverse board members with the hope 
that they can retroactively change the demographics and culture of the firm.233    
Critically, NASDAQ’s reforms, like virtually all of the major reforms 
thus far introduced, focus almost exclusively on boards.  None target the 
Diversity of senior and middle management—or the broader workforce as a 
whole.  The most charitable reading of their scope would be that they speak to 
the holes in federal employment law discrimination.  But, the bulk of 
opportunity that corporations provide for Americans to improve their lives, 
engage in fulfilling work, and interact with customers and communities, is at 
the other levels of the firm—where line workers, middle managers, and 
contracted workers collaborate to serve the company’s customers.  For reforms 
at the board level alone to effectively change corporate demographics at all, 
they would at best involve slow, incremental, and not transformational 
change—and for even that to occur, consistent board oversight and 
involvement to drive the deeper and more comprehensive action required to 
ensure that corporate policies toward all stakeholders embrace respect for 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. 
Many of the reforms rely on quotas as drivers of reform.  And while 
we applaud decisive action at establishing clear goals for organizations, and 
compelling corporate boards to open long-denied doors of opportunity, the 
threat of constitutional challenge is clear.234 And the outcome, given recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, is uncertain.235  Quotas are also gameable.  In 
	
232 See Brian Nordli, How to Make Diversity A Hiring Priority at the Startup Stage, BUILT 
IN (June 6, 2020), https://builtin.com/diversity-inclusion/small-business-diversity-and-
inclusion-hiring-strategy (noting “It’s so hard to course correct once you go from 50 people 
to 150-300.”). 
233 Id.  
234 A learned colleague posed this hypothetical:  Imagine a California-based corporation 
subject to the “at least three women requirement,” and that has only two women on the 
board.  A vacancy arises.  May or must the board limit its search to only women candidates?  
Even assuming it may do so without running afoul of anti-discrimination statutes because 
directors are likely not employees covered by those statutes, may the board do so consistent 
with the federal constitution if it is doing so by mandate of state law?  As a matter of law 
compliance, the board would have to consider not just its obligations under  state law, but  
under federal constitutional law, and make a difficult calculus about whether these statutes 
can be applied validly in a context like this where compliance would literally require only 
considering women candidates to the exclusion of all males.  And, of course, similar 
situations could arise to the extent that statutes were to require a certain percentage of 
minority representation, or of a particular minority, such as Black people.    
235 As a matter of recent constitutional jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has displayed 
little tolerance for federal and state law efforts to remediate past discrimination.  Prominent 
examples include its decision in Shelby, striking down key provisions of the Voting Rights 
Act that had been extended by overwhelming bipartisan majorities, and its decision in 
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, striking down a school district’s plan to continue efforts to 
promote desegregation and racial balance in its schools after being relieved of federal court 
supervision.  Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (holding that the 
Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula and preclearance requirement, which required 
covered jurisdictions to demonstrate that proposed voting law changes were not 
discriminatory, was unconstitutional); see also Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 





many instances, the numerical thresholds are minimal—sometimes just one 
diverse director—and the capaciousness and sheer number of factors that 
qualify as diverse present the opportunity for employers to selectively target 
people coming from groups that may be more socially or personally palatable 
to hirers instead of from those who are most historically or demographically 
underrepresented.  Thus, to the extent they represent check-the-box exercises, 
quotas allow companies to meet minimal numerical thresholds, and upon doing 
so can unintentionally encourage them to relax or disengage from further board 
reform.236  As at least currently contemplated, they risk being “half measures.” 
Finally, none of the reforms speak to closely allied, but importantly 
distinct, concepts of Equity and Inclusion, the “E” and “I” in DEI.237  As a 
result, the reforms do not provide the tools with which to address issues beyond 
board personnel, like ensuring an inclusive environment to support 
communication and innovative ideas from Diverse pockets of the workforce.  
Goldman Sachs has taken the laudable step of effectively constraining itself 
via a voluntarily adopted quota system in which it will only assist companies 
with IPOs that meet a basic board-level diversity threshold.  But this new 
positive standard does not address less quantifiable issues of corporate culture 
toward DEI.  For example, Goldman Sachs is helping the crypto exchange 
Coinbase in going public, despite moves by Coinbase’s CEO to limit Black 
Lives Matter protests and other communications about racial equity issues 
	
Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729-32 (2007) (plurality opinion) (finding that 
the use of racial classification to create a racially diverse environment was racial balancing 
and thus, unconstitutional). 
236 We stress, however, that how and under which context quotas are applied matters.  
Leaving the constitutional question aside, quotas can plausibly serve to forward a number 
of Diversity goals because it is often difficult to make progress on a long-standing inequity 
without a reasonable target to aim for and against which to measure the effectiveness of 
efforts.  The application of strict numerical goals thus far leaves, however, open questions 
as to whether or not ostensibly muscular measures like quotas would over time make a 
measurable impact on the representation of the most historically underrepresented or 
persecuted groups.      
237 As Nancy Leong recognizes in a similar context, striving for numerical diversity, 
without more, may result in awareness of diversity only in its thinnest form—as a bare 
marker of difference and a signal of presence. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, HARV. L. 
REV. at 2155.  Diversity could then be merely a useful word for nondiverse corporations 
to use to  acquire social and economic benefits of listing or incorporation while avoiding 
more difficult questions of racial and gender  equality. Id.  See also Derrick Bell, 
Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003) (arguing that diversity 
can be used in ways to avoid questions on race and class); Stephen M. Rich, What Diversity 
Contributes to Equal Opportunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1017–18 (2016) (arguing that 
the rationale of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), underserves equal opportunity 
by deferring to institutional constructions of diversity’s benefits, naively equating the 
achievement of numerical diversity with the accomplishment of those benefits). 	





within its workplace238 and despite evidence published about the widespread 
pay inequity allegedly suffered by Coinbase’s Black and female employees.239   
Our point is that it is, of course, useful and important to increase the 
Diversity of corporate boards and the C-Suite.  But these issues are just the 
beginning, not the end, of the conversation.  Unfortunately, legislating bright 
line, ex ante commitments to workforce-wide inclusion, to fairness and equity, 
to treating fellow employees and customers with respect regardless of their 
identity, and to providing equal service to all communities is difficult.  And, 
perhaps for that reason, the pending reforms also do not even purport to address 
issues like them. They are silent on other important issues such as the 
willingness of corporations to provide their services and products to all 
communities who can benefit from them, be they urban communities with a 
major minority population or struggling predominately white rural 
communities.  They evade any interrogation of issues like corporate 
recruitment policies, and whether and how corporations should extend searches 
to not only historically Black universities but also community colleges.  And 
they do not begin to contemplate DEI commitments corporations should expect 
or require of the businesses that they contract with.   
For all these reasons, we find it improbable that external law alone will 
induce the full scope of required corporate action.  At least as currently 
conceived, external regulation does not have a method to bake into the bones 
of corporations a deep commitment to equality, inclusion, tolerance and an 
ethos of valuing all employees, customers, business partners, and communities, 
regardless of race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation.240  At best, they 
encourage boards themselves to be a bit more representative, which is worthy 




238 Gregory Barber, The Turmoil Over ‘Black Lives Matter’ and Political Speech at 
Coinbase, WIRED (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/turmoil-black-lives-
matter-political-speech-coinbase/. 
239 Nathaniel Popper, Cryptocurrency Start-Up Underpaid Women and Black Employees, 
Data Shows, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/coinbase-pay-
employees.html#:~:text=The%20data%2C%20recently%20obtained%20by,employees%
20at%20the%20end%20of (“[W]omen at Coinbase were paid an average of $13,000, or 8 
percent, less than men at comparable jobs and ranks within the company…”).   
240 Although the purpose of this Article is not to spell out the positive actions corporations 
can take across these important dimensions, we note that there is a growing body of 
recommendations that corporate leaders can take advantage of.  See, e.g., A CEO Blueprint 
for Racial Equality, FSG, PolicyLink and JUST Capital, July 2020; Diversity wins: How 
inclusion matters, McKinsey & Company (May 19, 2020), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/diversity-wins-how-
inclusion-matters; Citi GPS, supra note 68; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Racial Equality: The 
Most Important Things the Business Community Can Do, Conference on Racial Equity in 
Corporate Governance, Oct. 29, 2020, U. Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 
20-56, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 635, SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3723950.	





IV.   THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY GOVERNING 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS  
 
As iconic scholars like Adolf Berle and cutting-edge thinkers like 
Elizabeth Anderson have made clear, corporations occupy a central role in the 
lives of most Americans.  A good deal of our lives is spent under the dominion 
of our employer.241  Whether we are respected and are treated as worthy of 
equal respect with each other during our time at work is critical to whether we 
have a life that is fulfilling.  Likewise, for better or worse, the United States is 
a commercial nation, and the respect with which we are treated by the 
businesses we depend on for products and services matters greatly, not just for 
how we feel about ourselves and our society, but for corporations themselves.  
For that reason, thinkers like Berle and Anderson have, from different 
perspectives in different centuries, come to the powerful conclusion that the 
fulfillment of the American ideal cannot occur unless powerful corporations 
themselves embed a commitment to equality and respect in their way of doing 
business.242   
The expanding universe of state corporate law reforms and public 
company disclosure requirements surveyed in the previous Section are 
sparking a much-needed conversation about Diversity, business, and the proper 
role of corporations in society.  But, as we addressed, they are unlikely to 
achieve in isolation the comprehensive changes  to broader corporate culture 
needed to assure corporate reputations, to protect all corporate stakeholders 
from discrimination and inequity, and to capitalize on the business advantages 
of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion for investors.  
The authority, and indeed, impetus, provided by corporate fiduciaries 
under corporate law offers an important additional tool for moving the dial. In 
	
241 The role that corporations play in creating an environment that is tolerant and inclusive 
is especially important given that Americans spend a major part of their lives at work: in 
2019, an American worked, on average, 7.9 hours at his or her workplace  and a total of 
1,779 hours annually.  See American Time Use Survey—2019 Results, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, June 25, 2020; Average annual hours actually worked per worker, OECD, 
retrieved Dec. 30, 2020, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS.   	
242 As production in the U.S. became concentrated in corporations, Berle observed that the 
dominance by corporations of the American economic scene changed the relationship 
between corporations and the modern state.  Large corporations amassed sufficient 
economic power to materially invade an individual’s constitutional rights, and therefore, 
as creations of the state, corporations have to carry out functions, such as applying the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, “for which in modern life by 
community demand the government is held ultimately responsible.” Berle described that 
this doctrine “constitutionalizes” corporations.  Adolf A. Berle Jr., Constitutional 
Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through 
Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952).  Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson takes 
a Berle-like perspective on the need for corporations to embed constitutional values of 
equality and tolerance in their treatment of their workers in particular.  As Anderson shows, 
Americans spend a huge portion of their lives in environments controlled by their 
employers, and unless these employers create a workplace that allows them to feel 
respected and valued, regardless of their origin, the full promise of equality cannot be 
realized.  See Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives 
(and Why We Don’t Talk about It), Princeton University Press (2017).	





this Section, we begin to connect the dots by providing a foundational theory 
of how corporate law of fiduciary duty applies to corporate  Diversity, Equity, 
and Inclusion policies.  Specifically, we situate fiduciary duty along a spectrum 
of mandatory and discretionary actions that speak to core obligations 
fiduciaries have to pursue the best interests of shareholders and the corporation.  
In a first step, we explain the foundational directive embedded in the corporate 
duty of loyalty as one that while comprising a substantive body of legal duties, 
norms, decisions, and traditions, is not a field of law operating in hermetic 
isolation of others.  Instead, the very DNA of corporate law’s most foundational 
duty, that of loyalty, is as much outwardly facing as internal and creates 
obligations to take affirmative steps to comply with laws that are of critical 
importance to the company and society.  In a second step, we then outline 
another key element of corporate law relevant to any social question relevant 
to corporations:  the wide discretion afforded to fiduciaries under the business 
judgment rule to go beyond mere law compliance.  We show that this discretion 
provides a safe harbor for corporate leaders to embrace effective and ambitious 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion strategies that they believe  will ensure their 
corporations’ respectful engagement with all stakeholders; improve corporate 
decisionmaking, productivity, and reputation; and enhance the firm’s  sustained 
profitability and long-term value.   
 
 A. The Legal Pursuit of Profit 
 
1. The Negative and Positive Components of the Duty of 
Loyalty 
 
Although corporate law practitioners, judges, and scholars often enjoy 
complicating the fiduciary duties owed by the directors and managers of 
corporations, the foundational principles are, in fact, quite focused.  Indeed, it 
can be fairly said that there is really one fiduciary duty — that of loyalty — 
and that properly understood, even the duty of care itself can be understood as 
a subsidiary requirement of the basic duty of loyalty, as we shall explain.   In 
any event, both the duty of loyalty and duty of care have important implications 
for corporations addressing DEI, as both duties impose certain mandatory 
obligations that fiduciaries must take to address DEI, and both enable them to 
take discretionary actions to implement effective DEI policies if they believe 
that is in their company’s best interest.   
To understand why, a brief review of the duty of loyalty is necessary. 
The duty of loyalty prohibits the director and officer from self-dealing, bad 
faith, and fraud at the expense of the corporation, a negative check on director 
infidelity.  But even more, the duty of loyalty has a positive or affirmative 
component that demands that directors and officers make a good faith effort to 
promote the sustained profitability of the corporation and the welfare of its 
stockholders.243 Thus, a loyal fiduciary must make a good faith effort to attend 
	
243 Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) (the duty 
of loyalty “embodies not only an affirmative duty to protect the best interests of the 
corporation, but also an obligation to refrain from conduct which would injure the 
corporation and its stockholders or deprive them of profit or advantage”). 





carefully to corporate affairs and make decisions.  For that reason, the duty of 
care flowing from that obligation has itself emerged as the other most salient 
duty in corporate jurisprudence.   
The duty of care’s implications for corporate fiduciaries are 
meaningful, even if the damages club to enforce it is comparatively weak.  
Under common corporate law formulations, the normative duty of care requires 
directors and officers to the corporation and its shareholders to exercise “the 
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances.”244  This normative duty was largely just that for most 
of corporate law history, because there were no cases holding directors liable 
for monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care.245  But the duty of care 
was always important because normative duties, even without liability 
potential, still had an important effect on behavior, and that is particularly so 
of reputationally and mission-driven people like corporate directors.246   
But, in the last century, the normative “soft law” operation of the duty 
of care was buttressed  by the “stick approach” adopted  in  Francis v. United 
Jersey Bank and Van Gorkom, and monetary liability was imposed on directors 
for a lack of due care.247   Even though  Van Gorkom  set the liability bar at 
gross negligence for the purpose of avoiding directors being too risk-averse 
because of liability risk, the decision in Van Gorkom still generated great 
controversy over the fairness and wisdom of holding independent directors 
liable for negligence-based conduct.248  The Delaware General Corporation 
	
244 Graham v. Allis-Chambers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).   	
245 See, e.g., William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Care and the 
Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 307, 321 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (“The long history that was 
inconsistent with courts directly imposing liability on corporate directors for violation of 
the objective standard of care was interrupted by the decision of the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom.”); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: 
New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 
1078, 1099 (1968) (“The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have 
been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search 
for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack.”).	
246 One of corporate law’s long-standing techniques, exemplified by Caremark, which we 
will discuss, is to use normative duties to drive behavior even when there is no personal 
monetary consequence for the fiduciary in failing to live up to those obligations.  For an 
interesting discussion of the importance of norms in corporate governance, see Edward B. 
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001).	
247 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 844-845 (N.J. 1981) (holding the 
estate of a director of an insurance company liable for her failure of due care in monitoring 
the corporation’s officers, who included her husband and her sons, and detecting that the 
sons were engaged in improper practices to the detriment of the corporation’s clients); 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding outside directors liable for 
monetary damages because they were allegedly grossly negligent in their approval process 
of a premium-generating merger).	
248 Van Gorkom was met with strong criticism for narrowing the business judgment rule 
and the resulting consequences. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule 
and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437 (1985) (explaining that directors will be 





Law was therefore amended to provide corporations with the ability to adopt 
charter provisions exculpating directors from liability for even gross 
negligence.249 Most other states took similar action and institutional investors 
supported corporations in adopting them, and thus such provision are now 
ubiquitous and render due-care damages remedies against directors rare to non-
existent.250   
But, as a matter of director reputation and public scrutiny, the directors’ 
normative duty to act with due care still has great importance, and is also 
relevant when independent directors’ deliberative process and efforts are 
important to the standard of review applied in transactions involving conflicts 
of interests of management,251 contested takeover attempts,252 or sales of 
corporate control.253  Moreover, and as we will discuss, directors’ actions in 
exercising care—again, the deliberative process in which they engaged—bear 
on their state of mind and whether they acted in good faith to fulfill their duty 
of loyalty.  For these reasons, complying with both the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care is constantly the focus of corporate boards, officers, and their 
advisors. 
In case law, the negative component of the duty of loyalty has typically 
attracted most of the attention because it addresses the important obligation on 
the part of fiduciaries to avoid causing harm to the corporation by acts, such as 
	
less likely to take risks and less willing to serve on corporate boards post-Van Gorkom); 
Lynn A. Howell, Post Smith v. Van Gorkom Director Liability Legislation with a 
Proactive Perspective, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 560 (1988) (observing that Van Gorkom 
was considered to have “triggered the dramatic increases in the number of shareholder suits 
filed, director and officer (hereinafter D & O) insurance policy cancellations, skyrocketing 
premiums, and the flight of the outside directors”).	
249 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).	
250 Cory A. McKenna, FDIC v. Rippy: Due Care And the Business Judgment Rule in the 
Fourth Circuit and the Potential Implications for the Banking Industry, 20 N.C. BANK. 
INST. 189, 215 (2016).  See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02, Statutory 
Comparison, note 6. 
251 See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (applying the 
business judgment rule standard of review to a merger between a controlling 
stockholder and its subsidiary where the merger was approved from the beginning by 
a committee of independent directors and an informed vote of a majority of the 
minority stockholders).  
252E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (finding 
that the directors’ show of good faith and reasonable investigation was enhanced by 
the approval of a board of directors that was comprised of a majority of independent 
directors). 
253	E.g., Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) 
(noting that “the role of outside, independent directors becomes particularly important 
because of the magnitude of a sale of control transaction and the possibility, in certain 
cases, that management may not necessarily be impartial”). 





unfair self-dealing254 or the usurpation of corporate opportunities.255  The 
intention is to prevent any possible self-interest exercising an influence that 
interferes with discharging one’s duty to the best interests of the corporation 
and shareholders.  Indeed, it is in these negative loyalty cases where the 
independent directors’ obligation of care has often been the subject of most 
attention.256   
The importance of the negative component’s role in addressing 
conflicts of interests and self-dealing has, however, left the affirmative 
component too often overlooked.  Although it is widely understood that 
fiduciaries should refrain from conduct that harms the corporation—such as by 
unfair self-dealing or entrenchment of themselves in office—the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty demands more:  that directors and officers make a good faith effort 
to advance the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.257  This 
affirmative component is not new, but has long been understood as central to 
the duty of loyalty in the corporate law.258 
This affirmative obligation has at its core the requirement that directors 
and officers act to promote the best interests of the corporation and its sustained 
profitability, within the limits of their legal discretion and their sense of 
ethics.259  This obligation of loyalty does not in fact put the pursuit of profit 
above all else.  Rather, the most fundamental requirement is that the directors 
and officers be loyal to the corporation’s basic license from society, which 
allows the corporation to seek profit, but only conducting lawful business by 
lawful means.  “Law compliance … comes ahead of profit-seeking as a matter 
of the corporation’s mission and directors owe a duty of loyalty to that 
	
254 “Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty” 84 LQR 472 (1968) , E.M.  
For an iconic Delaware case involving this principle in the conflicted merger context, see 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983).	
255 Eric Talley and Mira Hashmall, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 1 (Feb. 2001), 
https://weblaw.usc.edu/why/academics/cle/icc/assets/docs/articles/iccfinal.pdf.  For the 
classic Delaware case, see Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).	
256 For recent cases where the diligence of a special committee was relevant to a duty of 
loyalty claim against conflicted parties, see In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 
2014); In re Southern Peru Copper Corp., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011).	
257 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (“Disney III”), 2004 WL 2050138, at 5 n. 49 
(the “‘duty of loyalty … imposes an affirmative obligation to protect and advance the 
interests of the corporation…”) quoting BelCom, Inc. v. Robb, 1998 WL 229527 at 3 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 28, 1998).   
258 E.g., Thomas W. Waterman, 1 A Treatise On the Law of Corporations, 420 (New York, 
Bakers, Voorhis & Co. 1888) (“A corporate body can only act by agents, and it is of course 
the duty of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporations, whose 
affairs they are conducting.”).  See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, 
R. Franklin Balotti, & Jeffrey M Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand:  The Defining Role of 
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, n. 9 at 633,  n. 10 at 635 (2009) 
(gathering sources demonstrating the lineage of this affirmative duty). 
259 E.g., TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., 1989 WL 20290, at 7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
2, 1989) (fiduciary duty of loyalty requires “manag[ing] the corporation within the law, 
with duty care, and in a way intended to maximize the long-run interests of the 
shareholders”).	





hierarchy.”260  Thus, “[o]ne cannot act loyally as a corporate director by 
causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.”261 
This affirmative obligation to honor society’s laws is the foundation 
that permits the principled use of the enabling form of current American 
general corporation statutes.  Even under the capacious flexibility of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, the most important example of an 
enabling statute, the law is not just enabling, but, at the same time, prescriptive, 
allowing corporations only to “conduct or promote any lawful business or 
purposes.”262 Similarly, certificates of incorporation may enable corporations 
to engage in any business line or activity, but subject to an important bottom 
line:  law compliance.  Thus, certificates of incorporation may provide that the 
corporation may engage in any “lawful act or activity for which corporations 
may be organized”263 and “all lawful acts and activities shall be within the 
purposes of the corporation.”264 At the same time, charters can be revoked 
when there is an abuse of the corporate privilege.265 
 
2. Caremark legal compliance, norms and their 
relationship to corporate value and reputation 
 
Corporate law’s emphasis on law compliance is more than a recitation 
of ultra vires doctrine and requires more than that directors and officers not 
consciously cause the corporation to break the law in pursuit of profit.  The 
duty of loyalty demands that the directors make a good faith effort—i.e, 
genuinely “try”—to ensure that the corporation has in place compliance and 
ethics policies that promote adherence to the laws constraining its conduct.266   
This duty is famously associated with Chancellor Allen’s decision in 
Caremark267 and is now central to the functioning of any effective board of 
directors and management team.268  The case is canonical, though the 
	
260 Loyalty’s Core Demand, supra note 258 at 651.	
261 Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003); Metro Comm’n Corp. BVI v. 
Advanced Mobilecomm Techs., Inc., 854 A.2d 121, at 131, 163–64 (Del. Ch. 2004) (same); 
Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (NY. Sup. 1909) (where directors commit unlawful 
acts and cause corporate loss, they are liable).	
262 8 Del. C. § 101(b).	
263 8 Del. C. § 103(a)(3).	
264 8 Del. C. § 284(a).	
265 Craven v. Fifth Ward Republican Club, 146 A.2d 400, 402 (Del. Ch. 1958) (“continuing 
serious criminal violations by corporate agents in the course of the discharge of their duties 
could very well constitute the misuse of a charter”).	
266 For incisive discussions of the importance of law compliance to proper fiduciary 
behavior, see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. 
REV. 2013 (2019); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709 (2019). 
267 In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).	
268	For literature on the importance of Caremark, see generally Miriam Hechler Baer, 
Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 967 (2009) (“Even though the 
Delaware Supreme Court did not formally adopt Allen’s approach until over a decade later, 
lawyers and compliance providers responded to Caremark by expanding the level of 
services available to help directors ensure that proper systems were in place to prevent and 
detect criminal violations.”); Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681 





underlying facts still bear repeating:  A health care company had been indicted 
for felony violations.  Following the indictment, Caremark stockholders 
initiated several derivative class actions claiming Caremark’s directors failed 
to adequately supervise or correct the conduct of Caremark employees, thereby 
allowing a situation to develop and continue, exposing Caremark to enormous 
fines and liability.269 
To provide context for his opinion considering the parties’ presentation 
of a settlement, Chancellor Allen first evaluated the stockholder claims and 
cited various examples of the kind of conduct satisfying this standard, and 
made note of Caremark’s installation of a monitoring system; the publication 
of an updated guide designed to ensure compliance with applicable laws; and 
instituted a policy requiring officers directly approve certain contractual 
relationships in order to ensure compliance with federal regulations.270  The 
court then offered a baseline framework for assessing these steps taken for the 
directors, and held that whether a judge or jury considered the decisions of 
directors as “substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through 
‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational’”—so long as the court determines that the 
“process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to 
advance corporate interests.”271  
Chancellor Allen took an innovative approach to this important 
fiduciary responsibility.  He intentionally eschewed a negligence-based 
approach to liability for a board’s failure to monitor the company’s law 
compliance, placing it out of the reach of Van Gorkom’s gross negligence 
standard and requiring plaintiffs to prove more than that to obtain relief.  To do 
that, he formulated a standard based on the affirmative obligation of directors 
to make an effort to act in the best interests of the corporations.272  Thus, he 
held that liability for failing to monitor would turn on whether the directors 
failed to make a good faith effort to set up and attend to a rational system of 
monitoring.273  If they did not, directors violated their duties of good faith to 
the corporation,274 and by extension, their duty of loyalty.275   
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For the court, however, satisfying such claims involves advancing one 
the most difficult theories “in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might 
hope to win a judgment.”276 And when applying the standards to the facts at 
hand, the court held that the record showed no evidence that the director 
defendants were guilty of a sustained failure to exercise their oversight 
function. 277  To the contrary, the court observed, the corporation’s information 
systems represented a good faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts.  
Thus, Chancellor Allen concluded, if the directors did not know the specifics 
of the activities that lead to the indictments, they could not be faulted.278 
Though ultimately ruling in favor of the defendants, the Caremark 
decision’s doctrinal importance is substantial. Under the preexisting standard 
established under Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, directors’ duties were “say no 
evil, see no evil:”  as long as no problems were flagged for directors, they could 
assume everything was fine with no threat of liability.279  Caremark institutes 
an explicit affirmative duty, resuscitating foundational duty of loyalty 
principles, to be proactive in compliance efforts.280  Additionally, Caremark 
makes clear that corporate law comprises a substantive body of legal duties, 
norms, decisions, and traditions, and is not a field of law operating in hermetic 
isolation from others.  Instead, the very DNA of corporate law’s most 
foundational duty, that of loyalty, is outwardly facing and designed to operate 
symbiotically with the legal constraints and dictates of society to confine 
corporations to conduct that does not harm society.  Loyalty flows to the 
corporation’s legally chartered mission, which is predicated on a statutory 
requirement that the company will only do lawful business by lawful means.281  
Fidelity to that statutory mandate that  fiduciaries make a good faith effort to  
identify and understand the laws that are of material  relevance  to the company 
and how its operations affect the legally protected interests of its stakeholders, 
communities of operation, and society.  And the duty of loyalty therefore  
creates the prospect of liability arising from the breach of such duties falling 
squarely on the independent directors as monitors.  Thus, although external 
social welfare laws are not incorporated by reference into corporate law itself, 
the act of incorporation imposes compliance duties that cannot be disregarded, 
especially where they relate to key functions, operations or activities of the firm 
that may have material effects on others. 
In the more than two decades since Caremark, Delaware courts have 
largely required that in order to satisfy a claim against directors for a failure to 
monitor, a stockholder plaintiff must show one of two forms of deficient board 
effort to carry out their law compliance responsibilities.  One option is that the 
plaintiff demonstrate that the board “utterly failed to implement any reporting 
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information restrictions or controls.”282  Alternatively, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the board, having implemented controls, “consciously failed 
to monitor or oversee their operations, thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”283  These are both ways 
of showing bad faith disloyalty: the first by showing a bad faith lack of effort 
to address corporate compliance at all, the second by showing a conscious 
failure to monitor corporate activities. 
These standards are routinely acknowledged by Delaware courts as 
difficult to satisfy—echoing Chancellor Allen’s statement to that effect in 
Caremark itself.  They are not impossible, however,284 and recent suits have 
met the basic pleading threshold.  In the 2019 case Marchand vs. Barnhill, for 
example, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a derivative action brought 
under the first Caremark prong could proceed against the directors of Blue Bell 
Creameries, one of the nation’s largest ice cream manufacturers, after the 
company had been fined and the CEO had been indicted on various criminal 
charges following a deadly 2015 listeria outbreak.285  The Court in Marchand 
ruled that the shareholder complaint had alleged facts from which it could be 
inferred that Blue Bell’s directors had failed to institute any board-level 
oversight system for food safety—which was “mission critical” for the 
monoline company—and, as a result, had not received official notices of food 
safety concerns for several years.286  The Marchand parties ultimately agreed 
to a $60 million settlement, ten days before trial was set to commence.  Since 
Marchand, there have been at least three additional Caremark cases Delaware 
courts have permitted to proceed past initial pleading stages—in cases ranging 
from failing to oversee the clinical trial of a company’s flagship lung cancer 
drug287 to another’s alleged failure to monitor financial statements and related-
party transactions.288  In each, the defendant corporation’s management faces 
the prospect of removal or other penalties.  Additionally, the defendant 
corporations are faced with the prospect of millions of dollars of additional 
fines, along with harmful consumer and public backlash.  As important, failures 
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in law compliance companies have subjected corporations to huge corporate 
fines, management removals, and reputational damage.289 
We do not want to overestimate the liability club of Caremark, 
however, nor do we believe that is Caremark’s sole or necessarily most 
important function.  Rather, we, like Chancellor Allen himself, believe that 
Caremark’s primary value is in the incentives it provides to corporate 
fiduciaries to take proactive, preventative action to ensure that the corporation 
complies with society’s fundamental expectations.290  When a company’s 
board faces a Caremark case, the company has almost always already suffered 
severe reputational, stakeholder, and regulatory costs.  By way of example, in 
cases where a board managed to get a Caremark case dismissed, the record 
reveals that the company had already experienced management replacements, 
adverse publicity harmful to its reputation for integrity with key constituencies 
like customers, and regulatory fines and injunctions.291  
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These costs usually only grow with litigation, which may be more 
likely over time. Scholars and practitioners have taken note of the uptick in the 
successful number of cases escaping motions to dismiss and searched for 
explanations for it.  One factor cited for the trend is the greater use of Section 
220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which grants stockholders a 
qualified right to inspect the corporation’s books and records.292  Delaware 
courts have long advocated that plaintiffs in a derivative suit use this tool before 
bringing a complaint, so that they can meet their pleading burden under 
doctrines like Caremark.  
Given evolutions in how boards do business, this tool assists plaintiffs’ 
lawyers in accessing valuable information in seeking support for a Caremark 
claim, especially given that a petitioner in a § 220 action only has to show a 
credible basis to infer fiduciary wrongdoing to get access.293  With boards of 
directors acting in more informal ways and the ease of information flow by 
electronic means, the books and records relevant to investigating a potential 
Caremark claim has expanded, not just in form, but in utility.  For that reason, 
petitioners have been able to procure emails, text, and other more informal 
communications when a petitioner shows that the board in question relied on 
those means to conduct its business.294  Given that Caremark requires good 
faith efforts, corporate books and records that are devoid of efforts can 
themselves help a plaintiff meet its burden to plead facts supporting an 
inference that the defendants failed to make the good faith effort at monitoring 
required to identify and address key compliance risks in the first instance, or 
were aware of a major compliance issue and failed to make a good faith effort 
to address it.295  Of important note is another reality: even if a complaint does 
not survive, public revelation of corporate monitoring practices that, although 
not sufficient to support an inference of bad faith, fall short of best practices 
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can be embarrassing for the defendants and harmful to the corporation’s 
reputation. 
 In fact, it has long been understood that corporate law decisions, even 
ones that ultimately find no liability, can reflect poorly on corporate fiduciaries 
in ways that are hard to shake.296  Given the increasing focus of investors on 
EESG and other issues of social responsibility—which typically arise in areas 
where the corporation most affects others and thus are integrally related to 
issues of legal compliance, boards are likely to be under continuing pressure to 
put in place effective monitoring policies and to actively address material legal 
risks that could endanger the company’s value and reputation.297  Not only that, 
to the extent that regulators take a more assertive enforcement posture during 
the Biden Administration than during the Trump Administration, the salience 
of preventive compliance by directors and managers may grow even more. 
  
B. Fiduciary Law’s Safe Harbor For Rational Business 
Judgments  
 
Corporate law goes beyond requiring corporate fiduciaries to ensure 
that adherence to the law is taken seriously.  The business judgment rule gives 
them substantial room to create a corporate culture with higher standards of 
integrity, fairness, and ethics than the law demands, if they believe that will 
increase the corporation’s value, enhance its reputation, or otherwise rationally 
advance the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.298  So long 
as the directors believe in good faith that such standards are in the best interests 
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of the corporation, the business judgment rule protects them from judicial 
second-guessing at the instance of a complaining stockholder.  
For example, under Delaware law, the test under the business judgment 
rule is the lenient one of bare rationality.299  This forgiving test means boards 
have wide discretion to promote corporate norms that treat employees and 
consumers with respect, and that connect a reputation for integrity and fairness 
to long-term sustained profitability.  Thus, under Delaware law, if the board 
believes that action benefiting stakeholders like workers or creditors has a 
rational relationship to the best interests of the stockholders,300 the business 
judgment rule protects the board from stockholders seeking to overturn their 
judgment in litigation. 
This discretion bears emphasis.  That the empirical evidence is mixed 
on an issue or even tilts the other way on a decision, does not deprive that 
decision of the protection of the business judgment rule.  Rather, so long as 
there is a rational basis for the board’s decision, it must be respected.  Perhaps 
the most controversial illustration of that principle came in the high-profile 
drama over Time’s decision to stick to buying Warner Communications for a 
premium rather than accepting a gigantic $200 per share offer from Paramount, 
a bid that involved a premium exceeding $75 per Time share.  In his decision—
known as Time-Warner—denying Paramount’s bid for an injunction, 
Chancellor Allen famously said: 
 
It may be that in a well-developed stock market, there is no 
discount for long-term profit maximizing behavior except that 
reflected in the discount for the time value of money.  It may 
be the case that when the market valued the stock of Time at 
about $125 per share following the announcement of the 
merger, an observer blessed with perfect foresight would have 
concurred in that value now of the future stream of all returns 
foreseen into eternity.  Perhaps wise social policy and sound 
business decisions ought to be premised upon the assumptions 
that underlie that view.  But just as the Constitution does not 
enshrine Mr. Herbert Spencer’s social statics, neither does the 
common law of directors’ duties elevate the theory of a single, 
efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text. 
 
Directors may operate on the theory that the stock market 
valuation is “wrong” in some sense, without breaching faith 
with shareholders.  No one, after all, has access to more 
information concerning the corporation’s present and future 
condition.  It is far from irrational and certainly not suspect for 
directors to believe that a likely immediate market valuation of 
the Time-Warner merger will undervalue the stock.301 
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Chancellor Allen recognized that there was a strong chance that the 
Time stockholders would be disadvantaged by the board’s decision not to 
abandon the combination with Warner and accept the lucrative $200 offer from 
Paramount, but held that the directors’ fiduciary judgment had to be respected 
even under the heightened reasonableness standard of Unocal, stating: 
 
The value of a shareholder’s investment, over time, rises or 
falls chiefly because of the skill, judgment and perhaps luck—
for it is present in all human affairs—of the management and 
directors of the enterprise.  When they exercise sound or 
brilliant judgment, shareholders are likely to profit; when they 
fail to do so, share values likely will fail to appreciate.  In either 
event, the financial vitality of the corporation and the value of 
the company’s shares is in the hands of the directors and 
managers of the firm.  The corporation law does not operate on 
the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage 
the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of 
shares.  In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged with the 
duty to manage the firm.302 
 
On appeal, Chancellor Allen was affirmed in a decision that went even 
further in emphasizing the deference that courts had to give to boards’ decisions 
about debatable issues, even in the less forgiving context of reviewing their 
actions defending against a takeover.303 
Time-Warner emphasizes our core conclusion that the business 
judgment rule provides a corporate law safe harbor for directors to pursue their 
own vision for what is good for the company so long as there is a rational basis 
for their course of action.  Even more than in cases involving heightened 
scrutiny, the business judgment rule commands that courts not intrude on 
decisions about a corporation’s business philosophy and strategy.  For that 
reason, Professor Bainbridge has rightly called the business judgment rule an 
abstention doctrine,304 which leaves stockholders dissatisfied with the board 
with recourse to the corporate ballot box, not the courthouse. 
Distilled down, these principles support this succinct summary of the 
duty of loyalty under Delaware law: 
 
The duty of loyalty requires fidelity to the corporation’s best 
interests, which requires that good faith effort to: 
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i) first and foremost, ensure that the corporation 
honors its charter to conduct only lawful 
business within lawful means; 
 
ii)  within the limits of its legal discretion and 
ethical judgment, to seek to promote the 
sustainable profitability of the company for the 
best interests of its stockholders. 
 
And properly understood, the obligation to try to act with skill and prudence 
— i.e., to exercise due care — is itself a fundamental requirement of the duty 
of loyalty.  “A faithful fiduciary is duty-bound to try to act with care.”305 
Delaware law also provides directors and officers protection if they 
take good faith action that unintentionally causes the corporation to be found 
to have overstepped its legal bounds.  For starters, any suit for damages for a 
breach of the duty of care is governed by a forgiving gross negligence standard, 
one selected specifically to free corporate leaders from fearing that their good 
faith actions will be subject to liability at the instance of second-guessing 
litigants and courts.306  And, as we discussed, liability under that standard is 
likely to be unavailable for plaintiffs, because of the prevalence of exculpation 
provisions barring due care damages actions against directors. 
In many other states, both the flexibility, and by extension the  
protections afforded fiduciaries are even greater.  Statutes exist that allow 
directors to govern their corporations in a multi-stakeholder manner in which 
constituencies such as workers, communities, and customers can be treated as 
an equal end of corporate governance.307  In these jurisdictions, even the weak 
rational relationship test of Delaware law connecting action benefiting 
stakeholders to stockholder welfare need not be satisfied.  Other goals 
recognized in the statutes — in particular, the respectful treatment and welfare 
of key stakeholders like employees, customers, and communities can be an end 
in itself.  Similarly, there is an emerging for-profit entity form, the Public 
Benefit Corporation, that requires boards to govern in a way that is socially 
responsible and respectful of all stakeholders.  Under these statutes, directors 
have a “shall” duty toward society and stakeholders, and actions can be brought 
to enforce that duty.308  In addition, under the Delaware PBC statute and 
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statutes like it, a PBC director is afforded the full protections of the business 
judgment rule and deemed to have satisfied the director’s fiduciary duties if 
such choices are “both informed and disinterested and not such that no person 
of ordinary, sound judgment would approve.”309  This statutory standard 
affords substantial discretion to PBC directors in making decisions and is 
widely understood as enabling them to balance  the promotion of public 
benefits, fair stakeholder treatment, and shareholder value in good faith, 
without fear of judicial intrusion.310 As a result, outside of Delaware, and in  
PBCs in Delaware and outside, fiduciary duty law is more, not less, supportive 
of other-regarding corporate policies, like those calling for more Diversity, 
Equity, and Inclusion. 
 
  	
V.   CORPORATE LAW’S VALUE FOR CORPORATE EFFORTS TO 
PROMOTE DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND INCLUSION 
 
The affirmative obligations underpinning the corporate duty of loyalty, 
along with the discretion afforded to directors and managers in the exercise of 
their duties and pursuit of the best interests of shareholders and the corporation, 
have important implications for corporate Diversity policy. First, the 
corporation is charged with an expectation of lawful conduct—and Delaware 
corporate law explicitly identifies legal compliance as a core feature of the duty 
of loyalty.  As such, it requires fiduciaries to ensure corporate compliance 
strategies exist to assure compliance with key civil rights legislation and anti-
discrimination mandates that go to the heart of their operations.  Fiduciaries are 
also not excused from ignoring red flags indicating widespread discrimination; 
should they do so, not only do companies risk liability accompanying such 
violations, but directors too face possible derivative suits and liability. 
Second, the business judgment rule affords directors who view 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion as important values with enormous flexibility 
to advance such goals, and to do so on firm legal footing as a matter of 
corporate law.  Simply put, beyond the moral call to right past wrongs, or the 
statutory and Caremark-based interests in ensuring that corporate policies do 
not fall afoul of anti-discrimination and civil rights laws, there are rational 
evidence and logical arguments for believing that there is money to be made, 
and saved, for corporations that take DEI seriously, and thus that there is the 
required nexus to the best interests of stockholders required in Delaware.  This 
business rationale for effective DEI policies, invokes the protections of the 
business judgment rule and enables a wide range of policy reforms that go 
beyond statutory minimal protections embodied in longstanding civil rights 
laws —or the recently announced targeted reforms — to address the full range 
of equity issues in which corporations affect their stakeholders and society. 
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A.  Corporate Law’s Anti-discrimination Obligations 
 
Given the obvious materiality to society of civil rights laws and the  
reputational and economic harm that arises where they are ignored, there is no 
rational basis to argue that Caremark duties do not attach to adherence with 
them.  Some, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, require that companies 
avoid discriminating on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, and other 
bases not relationally connected to hiring or serving the consuming public.  
Similar laws also apply in many of the global markets in which American 
corporations operate and constrain corporate discrimination.311   
As such, these laws are foundational and affect the corporation’s 
employment practices and its relationships with customers and contractors.  So 
do laws like ECOA or the FHA that require corporations to provide equal 
access to important services, such as banking and credit, and to not discriminate 
in the provision of those services.312  As such, they lay at the heart of capital 
access, and in doing so, target business operations, practices and strategies at 
the core of regulated markets or industries in which companies operate.  
Virtually all impose penalties and fines where they are ignored, or can form the 
basis of class action litigation. They also, as discussed earlier, carry the 
potential of serious reputational damage, especially in this moment where 
customers, clients, and workers are more willing than ever to hold corporate 
actors to account for failures in equal treatment.  The adverse publicity and 
regulatory scrutiny that attends these kinds of violations can cause obvious 
harm to a corporation and its shareholder value.313 
 To comply with their Caremark duties, corporate boards must thus 
make a good faith effort to make sure the company has policies in place to 
monitor compliance with the laws that exist requiring corporations provide 
equal opportunities to job applicants, employees, contractors, and customers 
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regardless of their race or gender or sexual orientation.314 For all major 
corporations, by way of example, Title VII, prohibits discrimination based on 
not only race, color, and sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or 
gender identity), but also national origin,  disability and genetic information 
(including family medical history).315  Employers must also create a poster 
informing employees of their rights, and respond promptly and consistently to 
discrimination complaints.316  Employers may additionally be required to 
provide reasonable accommodations (changes to the way things are normally 
done at work) because of an applicant's or employee's religious beliefs317or 
disability.318  Caremark requires good faith efforts by directors to ensure their 
companies have policies designed to promote compliance with these legal 
requirements. 
In other instances, Caremark compliance may require monitoring 
systems tied to a company’s industry-specific DEI legal duties.319  For financial 
institutions, for example, ECOA not only prohibits discriminating against 
borrowers based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, family status and 
age, but are central tenets to the very business of banking.  It also imposes a 
range of disclosure requirements, including notices for applicants of consumer 
and business credit to ensure that they are aware of the ECOA’s prohibitions 
and communications informing them as to reasons why they were denied credit.  
For firms engaged in retail lending, from deposit-taking institutions to 
marketplace lending platforms, ECOA’s substantive requirements and 
disclosure obligations imposed on creditors are part of their business; failure to 
incorporate and comply can expose companies to stiff punitive sanctions that 
can reach up to one percent of the creditor’s net worth in class actions.320  
Compliance with these important duties thus comprises an essential aspect of 
protecting the long-term value of any lender.  Caremark would thus require 
systems for ensuring that proper disclosure practices are adhered to, and that 
the board was able to, and did, monitor the information gleaned from those 
systems or reported to them.   
Along similar operational lines, Caremark requires boards of financial 
institutions to establish monitoring systems for any obligations they face under 
the Community Reinvestment Act, a federal law requiring federal regulators to 
assess how well banks fulfill obligations to service low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods.  Like ECOA, compliance with the CRA is a core feature of  
effective banking operations, in large measure because federal regulators 
develop scores to evaluate applications for future approval of bank mergers, 
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charters, acquisitions, branch openings, and deposit facilities.321  Banks are 
required to inform customers of their scores when such information is 
requested, and their scores are also publicly available online in a Federal 
Reserve database, thereby creating significant pressure for banks to comply 
given public relations pressures.322 Additionally, failure to meet CRA 
obligations exposes banks to a range of penalties, including curbs on new 
branch openings and otherwise growing their business.  The degree to which a 
bank adheres to the CRA as a result can directly harm a bank’s reputation, 
profits, and overall shareholder value.  Fiduciaries, by extension, are thus 
required to ensure that a system for CRA compliance exists, and that material 
developments and information generated from it can be shared with and 
disseminated to them. 
Corporations have increasingly recognized that effective DEI 
compliance efforts are required by Caremark and are increasingly expected by 
all corporate stakeholders.  This confluence has itself given rise to new legal 
theories by corporate plaintiffs’ lawyers, arguing that fiduciaries have not only 
failed to comply with Caremark in their DEI policies, but have misled investors 
by overstating their adherence to their own stated DEI goals. 
 Thus, in a spate of new complaints, stockholder plaintiffs have  alleged 
that companies are making untrue statements about their commitment to DEI 
in their public disclosures, and thereby violating securities law.323  In these 
complaints, the plaintiffs also allege that directors are breaching their fiduciary 
duties by failing to ensure that that their corporations had in place effective 
compliance programs and efforts addressing key nondiscrimination laws.  
Along with monetary damages, the lawsuits typically seek a variety of remedial 
measures, including adding African American directors to the defendant 
companies’ boards, the creation of a fund to promote diversity and inclusion in 
the defendant company’s workforce, tying executive compensation to specific 
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hiring goals, and instituting periodic board diversity training.324  Thus, not only 
the claims, but the forms of relief sought, are novel for corporate and securities 
law cases.325   
 For our present purposes, the most doctrinally interesting lawsuit is 
Ocegueda v. Zuckerberg.  In Ocegueda, plaintiffs sued Mark Zuckerberg and 
the board of Facebook alleging that the company’s directors had violated their 
fiduciary duties by their inaction on diversity and inclusion issues. As in the 
other cases, the plaintiffs claimed allegations of misleading proxy statements 
and public disclosures.  What is, however, particularly noteworthy is that the 
complaint also alleges a range of other corporate law violations relating to an 
alleged failure to implement and monitor a reasonable system of internal 
controls and policies relating to compliance with civil rights laws and anti-
discrimination laws.  Among the infractions cited: a HUD complaint against 
Facebook alleging that Facebook violated the FHA by allowing advertising on 
its platform which discriminates based on race, ethnicity, gender, and other 
protected categories; a complaint filed by the ACLU for gender discrimination, 
claiming that Facebook allowed advertisers to target men for ads such as “Help 
Wanted” and job ads, and prevent the ads from being seen by women.  The suit 
also alleged that this, along with a failure to mediate the site led to boycotts by 
advertisers of Facebook due to its decision not to ban hate speech directed to 
Blacks and other communities. 
 We want to emphasize again that allegations are just that, allegations, 
and that the claims, which have been filed in California, but will involve 
Delaware corporate law, may not even survive motions to dismiss. But the 
allegations underscore our earlier observations.  The plaintiffs have (to our 
knowledge, for the first time) picked up on the fact that compliance with civil 
rights laws is also  important for corporations as a matter of corporate law.   
Civil rights laws provide an example of obviously material systemically 
important bedrock rules essential for corporations to honor under their charters 
from society to conduct only lawful business by lawful means.326   
The ultimate reputational consequence of this particular case is of 
course uncertain.  What is certain is that the press will cover it intensively, the 
defense will be expensive, and that there is the potential for additional 
unfavorable information arising that will compound the harm already suffered 
as a result of the underlying issues that had previously drawn adverse attention 
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But for our purposes, suits like these underscore the point that for the 
risk-averse fiduciary who is simply trying to avoid negative consequences for 
the company and herself, fiduciary duty law requires attention to a range of 
DEI issues.  A failure to  try to ensure that the company complies with core 
anti-discrimination laws not only exposes the company to fines and other 
regulatory harm if there are violations, but also exposes fiduciaries to 
Caremark suits in Delaware or similar duty of loyalty claims forwarded in other 
jurisdictions.  To dwell just on whether or not the plaintiffs prevail misses our 
basic point and that of Caremark itself.  By the time cases like these are 
brought, the corporation has already lost, through adverse regulatory action, 
internal tumult, and a damaged reputation.  
For these reasons, the prudent, risk-averse director seeking to promote 
the best interests of the corporation will engage at the board level  to make sure 
that the board and management are working together to comply with the 
important DEI-relevant laws requiring corporations to provide equal treatment 
of their workers, customers, and communities of operation.  
 
B. Corporate Law’s Protections—and Transformative Potential  
 
  We now address another important role of corporate law principles: 
supporting corporate DEI policies that go beyond mere good faith efforts at 
law compliance, and that embrace a comprehensive approach that makes 
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion integral to the company’s business strategy, 
culture, and stakeholder relationships.  That is, we address corporate leaders 
who genuinely support Diversity and believe that their companies should 
embrace it fully, but who might harbor concern that attention to DEI is 
somehow improper as a matter of fiduciary duty.  The reason that they might 
have anxiety of that kind is simple.  For many generations now, some have 
argued that boards of directors should be narrowly focused on maximizing 
corporate profits, as exemplified by leaders like the CEO of Coinbase, who at 
best may grudgingly accept that corporate boards have to devote some 
attention to law compliance, but nothing more.  Instead of spending any time 
on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, boards should just get hell-bent for leather 
to increase profits, do the legal minimum, and let external regulation be the 
sole impetus for social progress.327  Corporate fiduciaries should not worry 
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whether their companies have higher-than-required ethical standards and try 
to make profits in a manner respectful of employees, customers, and the 
communities in which they operate.  That is, we cannot avoid dealing with 
those who adhere to the view of Milton Friedman.  
But this blinkered view is not even persuasive under the corporate law 
of Delaware, the state corporate law largely understood to be focused on 
stockholder welfare.  As we have explained, Delaware law not only requires 
directors to put law compliance ahead of profits, it gives directors wide 
discretion to determine what is in the long-term best interests of 
stockholders.328  Directors are entitled to govern on the view that a corporation 
that has hiring and promotional practices that seek to tap the full potential of 
the available workforce, and to include people of Diverse backgrounds, 
perspectives and talents, will have an employee base that is more creative, more 
capable of relating to Diverse customers, more content, and therefore more 
likely to productively increase the firm’s effectiveness.  Directors are entitled 
to take the view that customers, strategic allies, and institutional investors will 
be more likely to want to have an ongoing relationship with a company they 
perceive as committed to high standards of inclusion and non-discrimination, 
and that is more representative of society’s overall Diversity.  Directors are 
entitled to take the view that the harm that can flow from poor DEI practices 
far outweighs the costs of committing their company to doing things the right 
way and spending the costs necessary to do so. 
Under the business judgment rule in Delaware, judgments of this kind 
are protected, as they have a rational relationship to stockholder welfare.  In 
states that allow boards to govern with a multi-stakeholder focus, there is even 
less basis for an argument that promoting good DEI practices is improper, as 
directors in these states need not put profit ahead of customers and workers.329  
And under the emerging public benefit corporation model, and its “shall” 
obligation to treat all stakeholders with respect, a failure to have sound DEI 
policies itself is what exposes the board to possible suit for injunctive relief, 
for example, if a board duty bound to treat workers and consumers with respect 
is found to have allowed corporate conduct that undermines Diversity, Equity, 
and Inclusion to the detriment of the workforce, communities of operations, or 
consumers.330 
The logic and rationale for DEI is not only a matter of cost avoidance.  
Rather, as we have shown, there is, at a minimum, rational basis for business 
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leaders to conclude that effective DEI policies will help them create and sustain 
smarter, thoughtful, resilient, respected, and thus sustainably resilient and 
profitable corporations.  The information base suggests that attention to DEI 
issues does not conflict with a proper respect for stockholders’ interest in a 
sound, long-term return; indeed, given the evidence, there is a basis to infer 
that inattention and insensitivity to important DEI issues bearing on corporate 
relationships with employees, customers, and business partners is what risks 
firm value in the 21st Century economy. 
These empirics and logical arguments are also supported by market 
behavior.  As we have noted, institutional investors representing diversified 
investors acknowledge that corporate DEI practices bear on their ability to 
create sustainable profits in a domestic and international economy, where the 
diversity of the available workforce, consumers, and strategic partners is 
growing, not narrowing.  Investors not only expect companies to embrace the 
full range of talent, consumers, and possible partners available to maximize 
value creation, but to also avoid the harm that comes from being perceived as 
adverse to inclusion.331  And without consumers, corporate profits are hard to 
come by, and we have also shown consumers, and particularly the younger 
consumers who will determine the long-term fate of today’s businesses, 
increasingly want to buy from companies that share their values.332 
Corporate law supports corporate leaders in acting on this information. 
Even in shareholder-friendly Delaware, the business judgment rule affords 
directors substantial room to determine the best way to create value, and to put 
in place a corporate culture with higher standards of integrity, fairness, and 
ethics than the law demands.  Corporate law also gives fiduciaries protection if 
they decide that the best way to avoid violations of law and negative 
reputational harm to the corporation, and achieve longer-term value, is for the 
corporation to embrace policies and goals that go beyond the legal minimum 
and to strive for the exemplary, even at the cost of short-term shareholder value.  
Fiduciaries may reasonably conclude that in order to create a prudent safety 
margin against law violations, a robust DEI program is necessary to instill trust 
in regulators and the public that can help if there is a situational lapse in 
compliance, and promote confidence in the workforce and customer base that 
will inspire their loyalty and greater productivity. 
Other protections deserve note as well.  Importantly, Delaware treats a 
Caremark claim for failure to make good faith efforts to comply with key anti-
discrimination laws like Title VII differently than if a corporation’s good faith 
effort to achieve Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion results in an unintentional 
violation of law.  If a board failed to make any good faith effort to ensure 
corporate compliance with civil rights laws, and thereby exposed the firm to 
lawsuits crippling the company, that would expose them to Caremark liability 
and no exculpation or indemnification would be available because the conduct 
involved bad faith, disloyalty action, not subject to statutory immunization.   By 
contrast, when a corporation takes good faith action to redress long-standing 
inequality, corporate law principles provide protection to the directors and 
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officers against personal liability; indeed, Delaware law provides directors and 
officers protection if they take good faith action that causes the corporation to 
be found to have overstepped its legal bounds.  This is relevant as it is, of 
course, conceivable that a corporation that undertook a comprehensive DEI 
strategy designed to promote greater inclusion of women and minorities in the 
company’s workforce could face suit if someone who did not get hired or 
promoted alleged that particular programs or policies resulted in unlawful 
“reverse” discriminatory practices.  Under Delaware law, directors and officers 
may be indemnified so long as their actions were intended to benefit the 
corporation, and even in a criminal case, so long as there was no reasonable 
cause to believe their actions were unlawful.  In defending themselves in 
litigation and in seeking indemnification, corporate directors are entitled to rely 
upon advice they receive from expert advisors in management and from outside 
advisers, such as law firms and firms that specialize in Human Resources 
issues, as evidence of their good faith.333  For these reasons, corporate leaders 
who address DEI issues in a thoughtful way, with the advice of key managers 
and qualified advisers, have no rational basis to fear liability. 
In a very real sense, then, corporate law empowers fiduciaries to adopt  
ambitious policies aimed at achieving greater Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion 
that they believe are in the corporation’s best interests.  This empowerment 
does not just extend to issues within the workplace but authorizes action to 
embed a commitment to DEI in all the company’s relationships with its 
stakeholders.334  Corporate leaders may take steps to embed a commitment to 
DEI in all the company’s relationships.335   
 Notably, such conduct would be voluntary.  But non-action would not 
be free of market consequences insofar as business rationality may in fact 
compel a faithful fiduciary who seeks to promote the sustainable profitability 
of the company to focus on good DEI policies and practices.  As we have 
shown, there is a rational basis to conclude that companies with more diverse 
workforces and boards perform better, and at least as well, as those which do 
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not.336  We have also shown that the racial and ethnic diversity of  workforce 
and customer bases is growing, and there is thus a rational basis to conclude 
that companies that access all avenues of talent and can relate to a broader array 
of stakeholders and partners will be more successful.337  As a pure matter of 
business, directors cannot blind themselves to change in a dynamic world, and 
the trends toward globalization and domestic diversity are economic realities 
that a director faithful to his affirmative duty of loyalty must bear in mind.   
Put bluntly, there is money to be made by companies that take DEI 
seriously, expand their hiring and promotional pools, and increase their 
customer base by seeking in an equal and inclusive way to get the most out of 
their workforces and profitably expand their services and product sales to as 
many customers and communities as feasible.  Furthermore, there is evidence 
that corporate action to promote equality will increase overall economic growth 
by generating more consumers and consumption, and create a more virtuous 
environment for long-term wealth creation, to the benefit of corporate profits.  
For this reason, a loyal fiduciary may, and there is a good argument it is duty-
bound to, make a good faith effort to foster good DEI policies and practices as 
an integral part of a rational strategy to promote a sustainably profitable 
corporation. 338 
      
CONCLUSION 
 
The clarification of corporate law that this Article offers will not, in 
itself, cure the lack of representativeness of American corporate boards  and 
management teams.  Nor  does it provide a simple  answer to the broader equity 
challenges that must be met if the corporate sector is to meet the growing 
expectation that it treat all its stakeholders with equal respect.  It is, however, 
a vital legal and policy tool  to help our nation live up to its ideals in vital 
economic activities  essential to human freedom and dignity.  Internal corporate 
action can address critical issues current external reforms either overlook or 
will be unable to solve without operating in concert with internal corporate 
action.  We applaud in principle the emerging  external law efforts to spur 
greater Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the behavior of American 
companies.  But, as we have explained, these external efforts have important 
limitations in terms of their application only to public companies, their  
inability to address the full range of issues where sensitivity to DEI issues is 
important to corporate treatment of stakeholders, and the difficulty any external 
regulation has in embedding values and norms in a complex organization, 
unless the leaders of that organization support that themselves.  The full 
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promise of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in creating not only a fairer nation, 
but stronger, more resilient, and sustainably profitable American businesses 
can only be realized if corporations themselves embrace these values in all the 
important ways in which they affect their stakeholders and society.  Our goal 
in this Article is therefore focused, but important.  We hope to have shown that 
corporate law itself has a positive role to play in supporting corporations in 
taking ambitious actions to promote Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion and  
contribute to a more inclusive and fair economy and nation. 
For too long, corporate law has been misunderstood when it comes to 
important social matters that happen to make business sense.  Diversity is one 
area where a course correction is needed.  In the current moment, that is being 
slowly recognized by businesses themselves.  But history shows that our ability 
to stay focused on issues of inequality is erratic, and that there remains 
substantial resistance to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in our society.  What 
we demonstrate is this important reality: that corporate law is no island to itself, 
and that the corporate law of fiduciary duty does not constrain directors and 
managers from promoting Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion.  If anything, 
fiduciary duty pushes corporate managers legally, financially, and 
reputationally to focus on these important issues as part of their duty to promote 
the best interests of the corporation, increase its sustainable profitability for the 
benefits of its stockholders, and to ensure that the corporation honors the laws 
of the society that chartered it.   
In sum, corporate law allows and in fact encourages corporate leaders 
to do the right thing.  Whether they do it is up to them and the institutional 
investors to which they owe their positions, because fiduciary duty law leaves 
them with no excuses.  Thus, the ultimate question is not whether business 
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